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The fallacy in that argument stems largely from lack of recogni-
tion of the eely character of the word "value." It is a bewitching
word which, for years, has disturbed mental peace and caused nu-
merous useless debates. Perhaps it would be better for the peace
of men's minds if the word were abolished. Reams of good paper
and volumes of good ink have been wasted by those who have
tried to give it a constant and precise meaning.
Judge Jerome Frank1
Throughout the bankruptcy process-and especially in any reor-
ganization process-the secured party's collateral must be valued.
Congressional history celebrates the fact that judges are to make the
rules for valuation on a case-by-case basis.2 Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 506(a), the provision that describes valuations of collateral, is
careful to specify that "[s]uch value shall be determined in light of
the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use
of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such dis-
position or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest."
Thus, the lesson about valuation is that it should vary from case to
case according to the purpose of the valuation.
Not surprisingly, bankruptcy courts have indeed gratified the
wishes of Congress by producing an extremely diverse and contra-
dictory set of valuation theories. These theories share a common
element, however. None of them is a verifiable proposition. That is
to say, the values derived by bankruptcy courts are not objective or
even subjective facts. Rather, they are subjunctive facts-facts that
can be assessed only contingently in the context of a hypothetical
universe which can never be.
Because valuations are not verifiable propositions, it is impossible
to say as an objective matter whether valuation standards must ad-
here to "liquidation" versus "going concern" value, or between
"use" or "exchange" value, or whether valuations should be ex ante
or ex post transaction costs.
But this is not to say that valuations are worthless. Even if valua-
tion theory cannot be viewed as a coherent and verifiable system,
the ideas on which valuation depend have logical implications for
issues not directly in view. A thorough study of valuation theories in
1. Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943, 946 (2d Cir. 1942) (footnotes omitted).
2. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 356 (1977) (stating that " '[v]alue' does not necessarily contemplate forced sale or
liquidation value of the collateral; nor does it always imply a full going concern value. Courts
will have to determine value on a case by case basis, taking into account the facts of each case
and the competing interests in the case.").
3. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
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bankruptcy will better enable a judge or lawyer to know the domain
that a selected valuation theory actually covers. Furthermore, if val-
uation theory suffers from contingency and is neither an entirely ob-
jective nor subjective practice, this is precisely the state of all other
forms of knowledge. Reality does not come to us except as medi-
ated by thought. To shun valuations because they are a pale shadow
of real market transactions 4 condemns all thought as effectively as it
does valuation theory.
This Article explores the valuation theories that have emerged
from bankruptcy law. First, I will describe briefly why a bankruptcy
court needs to value the collateral of a secured party. This list is
only tentative because bankruptcy lawyers are constantly expanding
and changing the parameters of their practice and, accordingly, will
always find new reasons to assess the worth of property. Second, I
will describe the subjunctive nature of these valuations. According
to this nature, value is neither subjective nor objective, but rather a
distinct category in which subject and object both have a role.
Third, I will examine the choice between liquidation and going con-
cern value, and the various permutations of these theories that have
emerged from the bankruptcy courts. Finally, I will examine the dif-
ficult issue of whether valuations ought to deduct expected transac-
tion costs of a hypothetical sale that might never take place. In each
of these areas, there is a great deal of conflict in the case law. Rec-
onciliation of these authorities is not possible and-according to
Congress-not even desirable. Nevertheless, I do hope to illumi-
nate the nature of the contradictions that confront bankruptcy
courts.
I. WHY VALUATIONS ARE NECESSARY IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Generally Speaking
A bankruptcy court is not necessarily required to value collateral
at all.5 But valuations must occur for a long set of reasons. It might
be useful to list some of them at the outset of this Article:6
4. See Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 128,
139-46 (1984) (questioning right of chapter 11 to exist because it is based on bankruptcy
court valuations of property).
5. In fact, unless some context demands a valuation, courts refuse to value the collateral.
See In re Mesa Bus. Park Partnership, 127 Bankr. 144, 147-48 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991) (Clark,
J.) (refusing to value property which had been sold); In re Turnbow, 121 Bankr. 11, 13 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.) (declining to value property subject to security interest since no
workable reorganization plan had been presented to court); In re Richardson, 97 Bankr. 161,
162 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1989) (HayesJ.) (finding that bankruptcy court does not have jurisdic-
tion to conduct valuation absent express or valid purpose).
6. On purposes of valuations, see generally In re Maitland, 61 Bankr. 130, 134 (Bankr.
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(1) Bankruptcy, of course, automatically stays all creditor actions
against the debtor or property of the estate, except in bankruptcy
court.7 A secured party is entitled to relief from the stay if the se-
cured party's interest is not receiving adequate protection within the
meaning of Bankruptcy Code section 363(e).8 One common type of
adequate protection is a large debtor equity in the collateral.9
When a debtor asserts debtor equity as the relevant means of ade-
quate protection, valuation is necessary to adjudicate the propriety
of the automatic stay. For the purpose of this motion, "debtor eq-
uity" means a value in the collateral that exceeds the moving credi-
tor's claim plus the claim of any senior secured party.10
(2) Even if adequate protection is provided through some means
other than a large debtor equity, a valuation is still needed in any
liquidation case because the trustee's right to retain the collateral
depends on the existence of a positive debtor equity." For this pur-
pose, debtor equity means enough value in the collateral to exceed
all the aggregate secured claims against the collateral.' 2 Thus, the
definition of debtor equity differs, depending on whether the mov-
ing secured party claims that it has no adequate protection under
section 362(d)(1) or whether it claims that a chapter 7 trustee has no
grounds to retain the collateral under section 362(d)(2)(A). Debtor
E.D. Va. 1986) (Shelley, J.); Butler, Valuation of Secured Claims Under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), 89
COM. Li. 342, 342-45 (1984); Queenan, Standards for Valuation of Security Interests in Chapter 11,
92 CoM. LJ. 18, 25-28 (1987).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988) (requiring that stay be lifted by bankruptcy court
"for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property"). Bankruptcy
Code section 363(e) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any time, on request of an
entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used,
sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or
condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of
such interest.
11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988).
9. See In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1984) (Alarcon, J.) (quoting In re
Curtis, 9 Bankr. 110, 111 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (KingJ.)) (calling equity cushion "the classic
form of protection of a secured debt justifying the restraint of lien enforcement by a bank-
ruptcy court").
10. In re Simmons, 86 Bankr. 160, 161 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988) (Jackwig, CJ.). For ex-
ample, ifA, B, and C each have mortgages for $10,000 on land worth $21,000,A has an equity
cushion of$11,000, B has a cushion of$1,000, and C has no equity cushion at all. Only C can
claim unambiguously that an equity cushion cannot constitute adequate protection. As to
whether B can claim no adequate protection (in light of a thin equity cushion), see Carlson,
Oversecured Creditors Under Bankruptcy Code Section 506(b): The Limits of Postpetition Interest, Attor-
neys' Fees, and Collection Expenses, 7 BANKR. DEv. J. 381, 397-407 (1990).
11. See I1 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1988) (stating that automatic stay may be lifted upon re-
quest of party in interest when "debtor does not have an equity in such property").
12. In re Aqua Assocs., 123 Bankr. 192, 197-98 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (Scholl,J.) (defin-
ing purpose of debtor equity); In re Digby, 47 Bankr. 614, 622 n.21 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985)
(Watson, J.).
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equity in this second sense is irrelevant, however, if the collateral is
needed to accomplish an effective reorganization.13 This necessity
constitutes an independent ground for the trustee to retain collat-
eral in the estate.' 4
(3) If a secured party enjoys an equity cushion, a trustee may
wish to obtain new credit by granting a senior security interest
under section 364(d). The trustee's ability to obtain new credit in
this manner depends on whether the trustee can supply adequate
protection to the current secured creditors, a determination that de-
pends heavily on valuation of the collateral. The new senior lien
must not invade the value reserved for the soon-to-be-subordinated
lenders. 15
(4) An oversecured party is entitled to postpetition interest, 16
but the extent to which the collateral is oversecured is usually
thought to be the limit on such an entitlement.' 7 A valuation will be
necessary to limit the amount of postpetition interest an over-
secured party will receive.
B. Undersecured Creditors
Valuation is especially important for an undersecured creditor
whose total claim exceeds the value of the collateral. When a credi-
tor is undersecured, a bankruptcy court will be compelled to assess
the value of collateral for at least the following reasons:
(1) The trustee may wish to abandon the collateral to the under-
secured party. If so, a valuation of the collateral could determine
the secured party's unsecured deficit claim against the bankrupt es-
13. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (1988).
14. Initially, section 362(d)(2)(B) was open to competing interpretations. Some courts
thought the words meant only that a chapter I 1 petition had been filed. See In re Rassier, 85
Bankr. 524, 527-30 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1988) (Kressel, J.). Other courts thought that section
362(d)(2)(B) meant that it was likely, under the circumstances, that a chapter I 1 plan could be
confirmed. See In re Planned Systems, Inc., 78 Bankr. 852, 865-66 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987)
(Cole, J.). In the course of depriving undersecured creditors of postpetition interest, the
Supreme Court has endorsed the latter interpretation. See United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Tim-
bers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 375-77 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (requiring a "realistic
prospect of effective reorganization" to protect trustee from lifting of automatic stay).
For a case placing the burden of proof on the secured creditor if the claim is no equity and
on the debtor if the claim is not necessary for an effective reorganization, see In re Swansea
Consol. Resources, Inc., 127 Bankr. 1, 2 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1991) (Votolato, J.).
15. In re Aqua Assocs., 123 Bankr. 192, 197-98 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (Scholl, J.) (com-
paring the standard with that of section 362(d)(2)(A), in which all liens must be accounted for
in determining whether debtor equity exists).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
17. There are many hidden controversies regarding the statement in the text. These are
covered in Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 636-
50 (1989).
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tate. 18 Such a valuation is not absolutely necessary. The court may
choose to await the secured party's actual foreclosure to see how
much money is realized. The court could then determine the re-
maining unsecured claim without ever having to guess at the hypo-
thetical value of the collateral. Courts may refuse to do this,
however, if the trustee objects.' 9
(2) If the trustee proposes to retain the collateral in a reorgani-
zation plan, and if the secured creditor dissents from the plan, the
plan can be confirmed over the secured creditor's opposition only if
so-called "cram down" provisions are met.20 Cram down provides
various alternatives for dealing with dissenting secured creditors.
Relevant here is the option of retaining the collateral and giving the
secured party debt instruments with a present value of the collat-
eral. 2 ' The secured claim can be crammed down in this fashion only
if the collateral equals or exceeds the secured claim. This version of
cram down requires a valuation by the bankruptcy court.22
(3) An undersecured party is entitled to vote both its fully se-
cured claim (usually put in a unique class of claims) 23 and its un-
secured deficit (potentially classifiable with other unsecured
claims). 24 For voting purposes, it will be necessary to value the col-
lateral, in order to determine what percentage of the secured party's
18. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) (providing that claim is secured only to extent of value of
creditor's interest in collateral; portion of claim that exceeds collateral is unsecured). In
Ridgemont Apartment Assocs. v. Atlanta English Village, Ltd., 110 Bankr. 77, 81-82 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1989), Judge Vining upheld a decision refusing to set an exact value to the property,
but instead establishing a range of value that was below the amount of the aggregate secured
claims. Id. This would be fine if the court below had lifted the automatic stay, but the stay was
continued. Id. at 82. A value range, however, is not good enough. A determinate secured
claim is necessary unless the collateral is released to an oversecured creditor.
19. See In re Caraway, 95 Bankr. 466, 467 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1988) (Roberts, J.) (disap-
proving of post hoc process and insisting on court valuation before abandonment); see also In re
Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 120 Bankr. 279, 297 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Buschman, J.)
(explaining that to prove what creditors would have obtained in hypothetical liquidation, pro-
ponents of plan need not solicit offers because suggestion of liquidation might panic market
place).
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988) (requiring that creditor receive deferred cash
payment which reflects full dollar amount of claim and which reflects present value of
collateral).
21. Id § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I); see also id. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (providing that court will confirm
plan in which creditor's lien in collateral is preserved and valued at amount not less than
allowed secured claim).
22. The text describes how the secured claim is crammed down, but an undersecured
creditor will usually have a separate unsecured claim, which is subject to different cram down
rules. See I1 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1988) (setting forth rules for class of unsecured claims).
The significance of this difference is described infra in the text accompanying notes 105-07.
23. In re Hallum, 29 Bankr. 343, 344-45 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983) (Kelley, J.) (defining
rights of secured claim holder). See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988) (setting forth rules for classifying
creditors in anticipation of voting).
24. In re Meadow Glen, Ltd., 87 Bankr. 421, 426-27 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Ayers,J.)
(discussing voting rights of unsecured claim holder). The procedure and consequences of
voting are set forth in I 1 U.S.C. 33 1126, 1129(a)(8), 1129(a)(I0), 1129(b)(1) (1988).
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total claim is secured and what part is unsecured.25
(4) The trustee, or perhaps the debtor, using section 506(d),
may wish to disencumber the collateral from any lien associated with
the undersecured party's unsecured deficiency claim. For example,
suppose the collateral is worth $80, and, prior to bankruptcy, the
secured party was entitled to collect $100 from the debtor or the
collateral. Under section 506(a), the undersecured claim is bifur-
cated into an $80 secured claim and a $20 unsecured claim. Section
506(d) allows the trustee or the debtor to obtain a ruling that the
collateral is encumbered by a lien that cannot exceed $80.26 Thus,
if the collateral later increases in value to $85, the secured party
remains limited to an $80 recovery from the collateral and a $20
unsecured claim. 27
(5) The debtor can redeem specified exempt personal property
under section 722 for the value of the collateral. 28 Since no sale of
this collateral will occur, the court must value the collateral to deter-
mine the redemption price.29
(6) A debtor who wishes to file in chapter 13 must have un-
secured debts of less than $100,000.30 If some of the creditors are
undersecured, valuation will determine the amount of unsecured
debt that counts toward this limit.31
25. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1988) (noting un-
dersecured creditor may vote unsecured claim in aid of secured claim).
26. Whether the debtor as well as the trustee can use section 506(d) is controversial.
Compare Gaglia v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1311 (3d Cir. 1990) (Hutchin-
son, J.) (holding that debtors could void undersecured portion of lien on real property) with
Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 592 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (finding
that debtors could not avoid undersecured portion of lien), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991).
As one commentator has pointed out, all the cases on this issue miss a simple point. When a
security interest for the unsecured deficit is avoided under section 506(d), it is simultaneously
preserved for the benefit of the bankrupt estate. 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1988). Thus, when the
trustee abandons the collateral, the abandoned equity goes back to the debtor, and the
avoided-but-preserved security interest for the unsecured deficit goes back to the creditor
who previously owned it. See generally Note, An Individual Debtor's Right to Avoid Liens Under
Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 263, 283 (1990). Because this is so,
the debtor can never benefit from capping a lien under section 506(d). Id.
27. See generally Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506(d) and the Theory of Bankruptcy,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373 (1991); Note, The Debtor's Right to Restrict Lienholder Recovery to the Value
of the Encumbered Property Under § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 J. CORP. L. 433,434, 438 (1986).
28. Cf. U.C.C. § 9-506 (1981) (providing that debtor has right to redeem collateral from
secured party after default, but must pay full debt obligation, not just value of collateral, in
order to redeem).
29. An undersecured creditor may receive even less than the value of the collateral if a
plan has been confirmed and if the secured claim has been partially paid down under the plan.
In such a case, under Bankruptcy Code section 722, the secured creditor can claim only the
outstanding unpaid balance on the secured claim, even if the unsecured deficit claim is totally
unpaid, In re Bunn, 128 Bankr. 281, 283-84 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991) (Pappas, J.).
30. See I 1 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988) (enumerating requirements of who may be debtor).
31. See Brown & Co. Sec. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246, 247 (4th Cir. 1991)
(Ervin, J.) (applying this principle to find party with total debt of $95,019 within chapter 13).
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(7) An undersecured creditor can make the so-called section
1111 (b) election, but not if that creditor's collateral is of "inconse-
quential value."3 2 Accordingly, a court may have to value collateral
to see if the undersecured creditor's interest in it is consequential. 33
(8) Finally, valuations are generally needed to perform some of
the trustee's avoidance powers.3 4
II. THE SUBJUNCTIVE NATURE OF VALUE
Value is a function of exchange.3 5 Since a bankruptcy judge will
determine value without the benefit of an historical exchange, the
judge is required to hypothesize one. The rules for this speculation
have never been spelled out. But this much can be said. Inevitably,
valuation must invoke a picture of what a secured party could realize
from the collateral if no bankruptcy had occurred. Otherwise, the
security interest would be subject to the rules of bankruptcy in
which an automatic stay is already in effect. If the automatic stay
prevents foreclosure, the secured party could not foreclose at all
and could realize nothing. Thus, if collateral is to have a value
greater than zero, valuation invokes an alternative universe in which
the bankruptcy petition was never filed and where no automatic stay
exists to prevent repossession and foreclosure.
This hypothetical universe with its alternate history is governed
by what one prominent philosopher calls "subjunctive informa-
tion."36 "What would have happened if... ?" is a natural ques-
tion-one that is fundamental to human judgment and creativity
and to the assignment of meaning itself. Unfortunately, historical
claims in universes that never did exist are not verifiable proposi-
tions. Therefore, valuations and other subjunctive claims cannot
count as objective facts in the rigorous sense of the word. Nor can
32. 11 U.S.C. § 1I11(b)(1)(B)(i) (1988). The meaning of this election is most obscure.
Very briefly, if the secured creditor is entitled to make the election, the entire undersecured
claim is deemed to be a secured claim. Id § 111 l(b)(2). But, as Bankruptcy Code section
1129(a)(7)(B) makes clear, the debtor need only give the secured creditor the value of the
collateral. The benefit of making the election appears to be related to defaulted chapter 11
plans, though even this is not clear. For an extensive review of the section 111 (b) election,
see Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under Bankruptcy Code Sections 506(a) and 1111(b): Second Looks
atJudicial Valuations of Collateral, 6 BANKR. DEv.J. 253, 279-304 (1989).
33. Tuma v. Firstmark Leasing Corp., 916 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 1990) (Ferguson, J.)
(upholding valuation proceeding to determine significance of creditor's interest in stock).
34. See generally In re Taxman Clothing Co., 905 F.2d 166, 170-71 (7th Cir. 1990) (Pos-
ner, J.) (finding that going concern value should be used to determine solvency in voidable
preference case); Fortgang & Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1107-08
(1985); Note, Bankruptcy Valuation Under Selected Liquidation Provisions, 40 VAND. L. REv. 177,
178-224 (1987). This essay will concentrate on the administration of valid security interests
and will therefore omit any discussion of valuation for lien avoidance purposes.
35. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
36. R. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 152-53 (1974).
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subjunctive claims disencumber themselves from objective truths.
Subjunctive claims are designed to have normative purchase in the
ethical marketplace, and this requires that they be plausible. What
force they have is rhetorical.
Douglas Hofstadter illustrates the dependence of subjunctive
claims on objective reality in a provocative essay on counterfactu-
als.3 7 He quoted a blooper reported by The New Yorker as follows:
"If Leonardo da Vinci had been born a female the ceiling of the
Sistine Chapel might never have been painted."38 The editor of The
New Yorker responded, "And if Michelangelo had been Siamese
twins, the work would have been completed in half the time."'3 9
Said Hofstadter,
The point of The New Yorker's comment is not that such
counterfactuals are false; it is more that anyone who would enter-
tain such an idea ... would have to be a little loony. Ironically,
though, in the same issue, the following sentence, concluding a
book review, was printed without blushing:
I think he [Professor Philipp Frank] would have enjoyed
both of these books enormously.40
Now poor Professor Frank is dead; and clearly it is nonsense to
suggest that someone could read books written after his death. So
why wasn't this serious sentence also scoffed at? Somehow ... the
parameters slipped in this sentence do not violate our sense of
"possibility" as much as in the earlier examples .... But why?
What is it about the way we classify events and people that makes
us know deep down what is "sensible" to slip and what is silly?41
Unfortunately Hofstadter has no good answer, but undoubtedly the
question is excellent.
Similarly, we may ask, "what makes one valuation plausible and
the next completely unbelievable?" No answer to this question is
currently available. All that can be said is that, if they wish to be
upheld on appeal, judges must make their valuation analyses plausi-
ble. As Judge Bonney has pointed out, "[t]rue value is an elusive
Pimpernel." 42 This is a good observation because, like the Scarlet
Pimpernel,43 value is a fictional character, whose viability, if you can
call it that, depends on whether we are persuaded to suspend our
37. D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 641-80 (1979).
38. Id. at 641-42 (quoting THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 19, 1977, at 107).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 642.
42. In re Jones, 5 Bankr. 736, 738 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) (Bonney, J.).
43. BARONESS EMMUSA ORCzy, THE SCARLET PIMPERNEL (1905). The hero of this novel
is a liberator of the rich and is best known for feats of bravery.
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disbelief.44
Consistent with the above, the customary valuation exercise of
bankruptcy judges is, "Well, had there been no bankruptcy, repos-
session would have occurred promptly, and a sale would have oc-
curred within three months time for X dollars."'45 This scenario is
plausible, but it does not logically exclude other equally plausible
scenarios, such as: "If there had been no bankruptcy, then the
debtor would have prevented foreclosure by deluging the courts
with procedural objections and would have ultimately blown up the
collateral with dynamite, so that the secured party's security interest
has no value whatsoever."'46 Both of these histories depend upon
assertions of what creative human beings "would have done," and
yet human beings are capable of anything! How can we choose
which one is the "true" counterfactual?
One might say, for example, that the first hypothetical history re-
flects ordinary events and the second reflects extraordinary events.
Between the two, pick the most ordinary counterfactual. But a re-
treat to abstractions of this sort amounts to the substitution of crude
rules for contextual speculation. 47 However reasonable the crude
rule may seem, it is not the same as finding out what would have
happened to the collateral that is actually before the court. This
subjunctive exercise is the very soul of valuation.
44. According to Judge Lindsey:
Application and interpretation of the law is an art, not a science. The donning of a
judicial robe confers authority and responsibility, not omniscience. This court can
no more see into and predict the future with absolute certainty than can any of the
parties or their expert witnesses. The Bankruptcy Code, however, favors providing
debtors an opportunity to reorganize, to be given a fresh start, and unless the court
can say with a greater degree of certainty than is possible here, that debtors' projec-
tions are unreasonable and cannot be met, these debtors should be afforded that
opportunity.
In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 75 Bankr. 580, 583 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1987). Notice
that, according to Judge Lindsey, subjunctive uncertainty translates into a pro-debtor posi-
tion. See also In re Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc., 120 Bankr. 279, 297 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(Buschman, J.) (describing valuation as "an imprecise tool, perhaps the best we currently
have, designed to reach a calculated decision on the basis of the hypotheses and assumptions
in light of a set of facts"); In re Terrace Gardens Park Partnership, 96 Bankr. 707, 710 (Bankr.
W.D. Tex. 1989) (Clark, J.) (arguing that "it is sheer arrogance for any bankruptcy court to
maintain that it can, in the space of a few hours of hearing testimony, actually set values with
binding collateral estoppel or res judicata effect").
45. See In re Offerman Farms, Inc., 67 Bankr. 279, 283 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (Melloy,
J.).
46. One court held that, if a debtor would have imposed a lot of dilatory defenses, this
must be considered in valuing the collateral. In re Asbridge, 66 Bankr. 894, 901-02 (Bankr.
D.N.D. 1986) (Hill, J.). Extreme litigiousness is roughly analogous to blowing up the collat-
eral with dynamite, in a lot of cases.
47. See Bowman & Thompson, Secured Claims Under § 1325(a)(5)(B): Collateral Valuation,
Present Value, and Adequate Protection, 15 IND. L. REv. 569, 572-74 (1982) (denouncing such rule-
making as violating intent of Congress).
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Alternatively, we can advertise our preferred vision of moral con-
duct by imagining a value based upon the secured party doing the
most socially desirable thing.48 Thus,Judge Cyr valued inventory in
a famous case on the basis of the most commercially reasonable sale,
not just on a reasonably commercial sale.49 But in pursuing such
visions, it should be noted that high values based on good commer-
cial practice in a subjunctive universe enrich secured creditors in our
actual universe, even if actual creditors cannot meet up to the high
subjunctive standards upon which such a valuation is founded.50 If
an undersecured creditor actually would have done a poor job in
marketing collateral, then there is an argument for punishing that
creditor in the subjunctive universe as well.
Thus, in In re Waters,51 Judge Clark considered the proper valua-
tion of assets which the debtor wished to redeem under Bankruptcy
Code section 722.52 He rejected a liquidation valuation on policy
grounds because it
calls for the creation of a "bankruptcy market" for exemption
"fair market" valuations. This court sees no more reason to call
such a marketplace into existence [a subjunctive note!] for re-
demption purposes. If anything, public policy militates against
recognizing such a market, lest consumers be tempted to file
chapter 7 bankruptcy solely to write down consumer debt to the
detriment of the consumer credit industry. Consumer credit
would either become prohibitively expensive (even more so than
48. For an example of such reasoning, see Note, The Cost of Realization by the Secured Credi-
torin Bankruptcy, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1091, 1106 (1975). The author of the Note considers a rule
that limits the bankruptcy trustee to recovering from the secured party only the sales expense
of collateral that the secured party would have incurred under state law. The author assumes
that "what would have happened" was a peaceable surrender of the collateral. In the author's
opinion the only "rational" reason for threatening to punch a repossessing secured party in
the nose was if the secured party's lien was invalid. If the security interest was valid, no
breach of the peace would have occurred. This view substitutes the objective rules of rational-
ity for a more contextual form of counterfactual speculation, in which fists might fly under the
influence of irrational passion. Id.
49. Chemical Bank v. American Kitchen Foods, Inc. (In re American Kitchen Foods, Inc.),
2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 715, 716 (Bankr. D. Me. 1976) (Cyr, J.); see also Stripp, Balancing of
Interests in Orders Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral in Chapter 11, 21 SETON HALL L. REv. 562,
569-70 (1991) (acknowledging most commercially reasonable disposition standard as valid
under Bankruptcy Code); Queenan, supra note 6, at 23 (approving of such instantiations of
good in subjunctive universes).
50. This is not only true for undersecured creditors who are more fully secured as value
goes up, but it is also true of oversecured creditors, who may collect more postpetition inter-
est if the equity cushion increases. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
51. 122 Bankr. 298 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.).
52. See In re Waters, 122 Bankr. 298, 300-01 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.) (review-
ing alternative approaches to valuation for purposes of section 722 redemption). Under the
section 722 provision, a chapter 7 debtor may purchase a narrowly defined set of assets back
from secured parties at the appraised value of each asset. See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (1988) (al-
lowing debtor to redeem tangible personal property to pay lien of secured creditor).
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it is already) or dry up completely were such a "marketplace" to
be opened up by the bankruptcy courts of this nation.53
Whatever the merits of the policy invoked by Judge Clark (and there
are certainly grounds to criticize his functionalist assumptions),5 4
this substitution of a commercially reasonable valuation instead of a
genuine subjunctive prediction of "what would have happened if no
bankruptcy" radically changes the nature of valuations. 55
If abstract rules are not allowed, and if a court must discover what
would have happened in the absence of bankruptcy, then no logical
reason impels one alternative history over another. Rather, choices
are edited on the basis of non-logical cultural criteria. This implies
politics or aesthetics, but not logic and not empirically verifiable
claims.56
But this does not mean that bankruptcy valuations are unpredict-
able and subject to no restraints. Quite the contrary. If the law is
indeterminate, bankruptcy judges are indeed predictable. They
tend to be culturally and temperamentally homogenous and they do
succeed in agreeing among themselves on what sorts of counterfac-
tual speculations are acceptable and what sorts are unacceptable.5 7
For this reason, it can be said that the law is simultaneously indeter-
minate and reasonably predictable.58 Yet even if adequate protec-
tion decisions are usually predictable, it is important to recognize
that construction of alternative histories is not the province of logic
53. See In re Waters, 122 Bankr. at 301 (citations omitted). The reference to a "bank-
ruptcy market" bears explanation. In one ofJudge Clark's earlier cases, a debtor claimed that
the proper valuation for section 722 redemption was the amount a bankruptcy trustee could
realize for the collateral In re Mitchell, 103 Bankr. 819, 822-23 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989)
(Clark, J.). Judge Clark rejected the notion that for purposes of valuation there is a finite
number of individuals, or "bankruptcy market," interested in buying only because of bank-
ruptcy. Id Indeed, such an idea also violates the subjunctive premise-what would have hap-
pened if there were no bankruptcy. But to call liquidation value generally the same as a
"bankruptcy market" seems unwarranted as well. Liquidation might constitute a valid "no-
bankruptcy" subjunctive event.
54. Judge Clark's functionalist assumption that every change in law affects price is the
hallmark of bad law-and-economics theory. There are economic reasons to support the idea
that marginal debtor-creditor rules have no effect on the cost or availability of credit, such as
when the cost of thinking about such rules outweighs the likelihood that such rules will actu-
ally harm the creditor. See generally Carlson, supra note 17, at 613-34.
55. Thus,Judge Clark rejects the secured party's claim that valuation should be based on
what the secured party
itself could recover for the property if it were to repossess and resell the furniture,
arguing that it is uniquely positioned to realize a high resale value because it regu-
larly resells repossessed furniture. That approach fails to balance the debtor's inter-
ests into the overall calculation, focusing solely on maximizing [the secured party's]
return.
In re Waters, 122 Bankr. at 302.
56. See Queenan, supra note 6, at 18, 43 (describing valuation as art).
57. Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Problem of Legal Expla-
nation, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 921-25 (1985).
58. Id at 917-45.
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or fact, and therefore, in any given case, there is room for enormous
free play.
III. LIQUIDATION VERSUS GOING CONCERN VALUE
The above sections have established that valuations are frequently
(but not universally) necessary to administer secured claims, and
that estimating the value of property is an art, not a science.5 9 Art
demands some structure, 60 and bankruptcy valuations are no differ-
ent in this regard. Accordingly, courts seek to govern the
counterfactual quality of valuations by means of some aphorisms.
At the highest level of generality, it is often said that a court
"should make an informed projection as to the amount recoverable
upon conversion of the collateral into cash in a commercially rea-
sonable manner."'61 Or, alternatively, fair market value is frequently
defined as "what a willing seller... and a willing buyer ... would
agree upon after the property has been exposed to the market for a
reasonable amount of time." 62 Such formulations seem almost en-
tirely without content, and so the choice for hypothesizing market
exchanges is usually narrowed down to a choice of going concern
value and liquidation value.63 Liquidation value is usually taken to
imply what the creditor could realize in a forced sale under the rules
of U.C.C. article 9, real estate mortgage provisions, or, even worse,
under the rules of judicial execution. Such sales are notoriously
poor in producing cash proceeds,6 and, if hypothetical liquidation
is the standard, a court could easily justify a low figure by way of
value.
Going concern value has been used in two senses. First, it might
represent what a third party would pay for an entire business.
65 Al-
59. This assumes that such a distinction between art and science is ever valid, a proposi-
tion some philosophers of science would deny. See generally P. FEYERABEND, SCIENCE IN A FREE
SocINTr (1978).
60. See generally J. DERRIDA, THE TRUTH IN PAINTING (1987).
61. In re QPL Components, Inc., 20 Bankr. 342, 345 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(Radeyovich, J.); see also In re Willis, 115 Bankr. 518, 520 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1989) (Bishop, J.)
(choosing wholesale value on this basis).
62. In re Markowitz Bldg. Co., 84 Bankr. 484, 487 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (Speer, J.).
For a list of various aphorisms that courts have used, see Butler, supra note 6, at 344.
63. Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 34, at 1063. But see In re Phoenix Steel Corp., 39
Bankr. 218, 226-27 (D. Del. 1984) (Schwartz, J.) (valuing collateral as splitting difference be-
tween liquidation and going concern value). For a case holding that the detailed liquidation
procedures in the Agricultural Credit Act do not require the bankruptcy court to adopt a
liquidation standard in farm credit cases, see In re Felten, 95 Bankr. 629, 632 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1988) (Melloy, J.).
64. For a good description of why this is so, see In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. 1, 6 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1990) (Queenan, J.).
65. In re T.H.B. Corp., 85 Bankr. 192, 195 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (Queenan, J.). Going
concern value might still be used even if it is thought that no one would buy the property in
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ternatively, it might represent the selling price of inventory in the
ordinary course of business and is therefore synonymous with retail
value.66 Either way, in a reorganization proceeding, going concern
value is supposed to exceed liquidation value.67
The added content of such aphorisms, however, should not be
overrated. Both going concern value and liquidation value can eas-
ily collapse into each other. For example, a liquidating secured
party might be able to sell the collateral as part of a going concern,
although it would require considerable help from the equity powers
of a state court.68 Admittedly, this occurs infrequently, but the con-
ceivable competes with the probable in subjunctive speculation.
Very frequently, courts choose going concern value in reorganiza-
tion cases and choose liquidation value in liquidation cases. 69 This
question. In In re Raylin Development Co., I10 Bankr. 259, 260 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989),
Judge Clark substituted investors for buyers and then hypothesized an investment in tie firm
to determine value. This captures the value of an income producing asset even ifno buyers of
the asset are thought to exist. Id.
66. See In re Kids Stop of America, Inc., 64 Bankr. 397, 401-02 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986)
(Paskay,J.) (equating going concern value with retail value of inventory in debtor's business).
67. It is sometimes argued that secured parties ought to get a going concern value that is
lower than or equal to liquidation value, because the debtor is an incompetent manager or
irrational economic actor;, this version of going concern value assumes, of course, that the
debtor would continue to be in operation. Courts reject this argument and insist the property
be valued according to its best use, not the suboptimal use that currently exists. In re Peer-
man, 109 Bankr. 718, 721-22 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) (Monroe, J.); In re Ehrich, 109 Bankr.
390, 391 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1989) (HoytJ.). In Peerman, it was the secured party, not the debtor,
who argued for the low value. In re Peerman, 109 Bankr. at 719-20. The case involved "asset
payment"-transfer of the collateral in satisfaction of antecedent debt. Id. The lower the
value, the higher the secured party's remaining deficit claim would have been in bankruptcy.
Meanwhile, if the valuation turned out to be too low, so much the better for the secured party
who could later sell the collateral for the higher "correct" price and keep the profit.
68. But see Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp. (In re Craddock-
Terry Shoe Corp.), 98 Bankr. 250, 254 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (Anderson, J.) (denying that,
at state law, secured party could reach going concern value of firm in pursuit of individual
pieces of collateral). This view underestimates the equitable powers of a court to aid debt
collection. Antiquarians will remember that, prior to the introduction of the reorganization
chapters in the Depression, business reorganizations were executed entirely through the equi-
table powers of courts to appoint receivers on behalf of the creditors. These receivers very
frequently worked for the benefit of secured creditors. See Note, Corporate Receiverships and
Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 285, 291 (1988) (discussing procedure and
criticism of consent receiverships).
69. See, e.g., In re Vitreous Steel Prods. Co., 911 F.2d 1223, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1990) (Cof-
fey, J.) (upholding choice of liquidation value in chapter 7 case); Bank Hapoalim B.M. v. E.L.I.
Ltd., 42 Bankr. 376, 379 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (Bua,J.) (deciding liquidation value should be used
for liquidation cases, and going concern value should be used for reorganization cases);
American Universal Ins. Co. v. Dunlap (In re Microwave Prods. of Am., Inc.), 118 Bankr. 566,
572 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990) (Donald, J.) (using going concern value in reorganization
case); Robinson Ranch, Inc., 75 Bankr. 606, 608-09 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (Peterson, J.)
(noting that chapter 12 requires use of fair market value and not liquidation value); In re
Phoenix Steel Corp., 39 Bankr. 218, 226-27 (D. Del. 1984) (Schwartz, J.) (explaining that
court was unsure whether debtor would liquidate or remain a going concern, so it averaged
liquidation and going concern values); Downey Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Helionetics, Inc. (In re
Helionetics, Inc.), 70 Bankr. 433, 439 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1987) (Ryan, J.) (requiring going
concern value in chapter 11 cases, absent unusual circumstances); L. LoPucKi, STRATzE S
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rule has the dubious virtue of associational logic.7 0 In addition, as
courts have recognized, 7' section 506(a) seems to support a switch
to going concern value by providing that value should be deter-
mined "in light of the ... use of such property .... ,72 This sentence
contradicts the idea that value must be determined according to
what would have happened in a subjunctive no-bankruptcy universe,
since how property is used in reality does not necessarily affect how
property would have been used in a non-existent universe.
The cases that routinely associate going concern value with reor-
ganization proceedings are vociferously attacked by Judge Queenan
in his learned essay on bankruptcy valuation.73 His position is sim-
ply that judges should always imagine a sale by a secured party, and
therefore nothing about a chapter 11 going concern should determine
a valuation standard (although it may provide evidence that can be
used in subjunctive speculation). 74 This position would provide a
great deal more coherence to the law of valuation, but such a stan-
dard is inconsistent with section 506(a) which requires considera-
tion of how the property is being used today.7 5
FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 494 (1985) (noting preference for going con-
cern value if debtor is going concern, but liquidation value if debtor decided to liquidate);
Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 34, at 1087 (noting that court will use going concern value if
appropriate in light of debtor's situation); see also Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess., 495 (1975-76) (testimony of Patrick Murphy) (noting preference for going concern
value if debtor is going concern).
70. As Judge Norton put it in a famous case:
Having declared itself to be a fish to be reorganized, it would be inconsistent for the
court now to permit the debtor to declare itself a fowl to be liquidated for purposes
of'cramming down' a lower 'appraisal' value upon the secured creditors. Therefore,
a liquidation value, i.e., a foreclosure value, is a procedure totally foreign to this
matter and not a proper standard for valuation.
In re Pine Gate Assocs., 12 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 607, 624, 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 301,
309 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1977) (Norton, J.). Or, for another sportsman's aphorism, "the debtor
cannot eat with the hounds and run with the hares." In re Crockett, 3 Bankr. 365, 367 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1980) (Eisen,J.). See also Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. REV. 925, 939 (1980) (stating that "[i]t is incongruous to value a
business that is being reorganized on the basis of the price its assets could fetch on a piece-
meal liquidation when the entire theory of the reorganization is that the debtor is being pre-
served as a going concern").
71. See In re Frost, 47 Bankr. 961, 963-64 (D. Kan. 1985) (Rodgers, J.) (citing legislative
history of section 506(a) in noting provision's preference for going concern value).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
73. Queenan, supra note 6, at 32-34.
74. See In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. 1, 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (Queenan, J.) (finding that
"use of collateral by a debtor, even by one who has placed his house in financial order, is a
neutral factor in establishing a standard of valuation"); In re T.H.B. Corp., 85 Bankr. 192, 196
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (Queenan, J.) (advocating that "[t]he fact that the debtor is a going
concern is no reason to value the collateral under the going concern standard unless it ap-
pears likely that the secured party will actually receive that value from its collateral through a
pending sale").
75. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting section 506(a) preference for deter-
mining value in light of use of property).
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judge Queenan has offered two responses to the challenge that
section 506(a) demands accounting for how a debtor actually pro-
poses to use collateral. First, in his essay, he writes "[t]he debtor's
use of the collateral is relevant to valuation if the nature of that use
physically affects the value of the collateral, either for good or
bad." 76 But historical events in the bankruptcy proceeding cannot
so easily infect "what if" speculation. The "what if" game asks
what would have happened if the bankruptcy never occurred; postban-
kruptcy use of property is therefore precisely what subjunctive rea-
soning demands to be excluded. At best it can serve as evidence of
what would have happened to the collateral if no bankruptcy had
occurred.
In a later opinion, Judge Queenan abandons this tactic and tries a
new one based on the language of the Bankruptcy Code. In In re
Robbins, 7 a second mortgagee claimed it was not adequately pro-
tected and that, therefore, the stay ought to be lifted. 78 Judge
Queenan used this motion as an occasion to philosophize about val-
uing collateral for the purpose of determining whether the value of
the secured party's claim was eroding over time. 79 In Robbins, Quee-
nan points out that, whereas section 506(a) requires consideration
of how the property is actually to be used, it also specifies that the
thing to be valued is not the collateral itself, but rather the creditor's
lien on the collateral.80 According to Judge Queenan, "This word-
ing is crucial .... The phrase 'the value of such creditor's interest' is
not equivalent to the value of the collateral."'' l This need to value
the lien (and not the collateral) negates the requirement that actual,
intended use of the collateral must be considered in valuation.8 2
Thus, because we must value the lien (not the collateral), we are
76. Queenan, supra note 6, at 33.
77. 119 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (Queenan,J.).
78. In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. 1, 2 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (Queenan, J.).
79. See id at 3-6 (discussing valuation standard used to determine changing value of se-
cured party's claim).
80. Id at 3; see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988) (stating that "[a]n allowed claim... is a
secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property. .. ") (emphasis added).
81. In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. at 3.
82. Id. at 4. Judge Queenan explains:
It makes no sense to attach independent significance to the Debtor's use of the prop-
erty. Use of collateral by a debtor, even one who has placed his financial house in
order, is a neutral factor in establishing a standard of valuation. We are dealing here
with valuation of a mortgage interest and not the property itself. Except to the ex-
tent that a sale at fair market value is a substantial possibility, a security interest is
worth what it will bring at a commercially reasonable foreclosure.
lId The assumption that, but for a bankruptcy, a foreclosure sale would be commercially
reasonable-a disputable proposition-is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 47-
55.
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thrown entirely into the subjunctive universe of pure speculation
with no need to consider how the property is actually being used.
Liens, Judge Queenan implies, have meaning only in a foreclosure,
and so we must ignore the debtor's intent to retain the collateral
and attend only to the imagined foreclosure.83
If Queenan is right, then the first part of section 506(a) requires
us to imagine value in a no-bankruptcy world, while the second part
of section 506(a) insists that we consider what is to become of the
collateral in the real world. The second part of section 506(a) may
be ignored, because the collateral actually used has nothing to do
with the lien being subjunctively valued.8 4
Yet, inconsistently, Judge Queenan also indicates that he would
have used the actual sales price in a case where the trustee sold the
collateral.85 Thus, Queenan is not quite willing to commit himself
totally to subjunctive reasoning. If he had been so committed, an
actual sale would have been irrelevant. Instead, a potentially lower
value could be assigned the collateral, and the trustee could keep a
profit from selling the collateral for a higher price in the real
world.8 6 Apparently, this arbitrage between real and subjunctive
markets was even more than Judge Queenan, a dedicated subjunc-
tivist, could bear.
In the end, the choice between liquidation or going concern value
is based on whether you think that secured parties or general credi-
tors should own the bonus that adheres to the idea of a going con-
cern. Who deserves what property is a question on which we can all
have intuitions, 7 but logic alone cannot settle such questions in an
uncontroversial manner.88
83. In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. at 6.
84. In reorganization cases,Judge Queenan implies that going concern value should not be
used:
The purpose of this valuation sheds no light on the standard to be used. We are not
concerned, for example, with a valuation under § 1129(a)(7) of property, which cred-
itors would receive or retain in a liquidation, where liquidation value is perhaps most
relevant.
In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. at 3. Section 1129(a)(7) is the "best interest of the creditors" test.
Its implications for valuation are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 89-107.
85. In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. at 3-4; see also In re Ledgemere Land Corp., 125 Bankr. 58,
61-62 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991) (Queenan, J.) (using offered price to set value of real estate).
86. On this arbitrage possibility, see Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under Bankruptcy Code
Sections 506(a) and I I l(b): Second Looks atJudicial Valuations of Collateral, 6 BANKR. DEv.J. 253,
260-63 (1989); Note, Selling Out Undersecured Creditors: "Value" Under § 363(l) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 1251, 1254 (1987).
87. See In re Pullman Constr. Indus., 107 Bankr. 909, 939 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989)
(Schmetterer, J.) (finding that "[ilt is grossly inequitable and unfairly discriminatory to 'cram
down' forced liquidation values in case that does not involve chapter 11 liquidating plan").
88. See Pachulski, supra note 70, at 958 (stating that "[t]he philosophical question implicit
in the battle over valuation methods in this situation is whether the secured creditor is entitled
to a portion of the going concern bonus inherent in its collateral").
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A. The Implications of the "Best Interests of the Creditors" Rule
In choosing between going concern or liquidation value, we have
seen that, through the power of simile, many courts have been led to
use liquidation value in liquidation cases and going concern value in
reorganizations. There is an interesting doctrinal argument in favor
of liquidation value in chapter 11 cases, however. If accepted, it
promises to shift massive wealth from partially secured creditors to
unsecured creditors.
This argument uses the so-called "best interests of the creditors"
rule in chapter 11 under which every dissenting creditor is entitled
to get the same amount or more from the chapter 11 plan as from a
hypothetical liquidation.8 9 The rule guarantees that everyone is
either unaffected or better off with a going concern than with a liqui-
dation or, to use a fancy term, that chapter 11 plans are pareto supe-
rior to liquidations. Since chapter 11 requires that the secured party
get no less than she would have gotten in a chapter 7 liquidation, it
might seem appropriate that the secured party's collateral be given
its liquidation value. It certainly appears peculiar that, after hypoth-
esizing what a liquidation would have brought in, a court might
value the collateral as if the firm were a going concern. This argu-
ment is not entirely unfair either. If "what would have happened"
without chapter 11 is a liquidation, then the undersecured party's
participation in the largess of a chapter 11 plan could be viewed as
pure windfall. 90
In such matters, it is always possible to argue the opposite. Ac-
cordingly, one commentator finds in the "best interests" rule the
exact reverse implication from what has just been suggested. 91 Ac-
cording to Isaac Pachulski, if the "best interests" test of Bankruptcy
Code section 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) requires a liquidation standard, then
the separate "fair and equitable" rule of cram down 92 must require
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1988) (setting forth that "[ejach holder of a claim
or interest... will receive or retain under the plan.., a value.., not less than the amount
that such holder would so receive or return if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of
this title").
90. See In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (Queenan,J.) (implying that
liquidation is mandated by section 1129(a)(7)); see also In re Jumpers Equities, Ltd., 4 B.C.D.
1269, 1270 (Bankr. D. Md. 1978) (Thomsen, J.) (holding liquidation value is constitutional
minimum that secured parties must get and that going concern value is just bonus). This
holding, however, is bad constitutional law. The Bankruptcy Code need not give anything to
secured parties, although perhaps an argument can be made against retrospective application
of bankruptcy legislation. See Carlson, supra note 17, at 585-89 (discussing constitutional dif-
ference between retroactive and prospective bankruptcy legislation).
91. See Pachulski, supra note 70, at 958-59.
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988) (setting forth that "the court.., shall confirm the
plan ... if the plan is fair and equitable with respect to each class of claims of interests ....").
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something else. Otherwise, it is entirely redundant, and Congress is
presumed never to act inefficaciously.
The problem with such arguments is that they are defeated if
some necessity can be found for the statutory provision accused of
being redundant. As Puchulski recognizes, the cram down provi-
sion is not redundant because it serves to rule out the possibility
that secured parties will be given equity securities for their collat-
eral. 93 By virtue of this demonstration of utility, it is now possible to
use liquidation for both the "best interests" rule and the "fair and
equitable" rule. Indeed, even Pachulski himself calls the sudden
shifting of valuation standards in the middle of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding "bizarre" (though he defends it).94
The argument that section 1129(a)(7) compels liquidation value
in a chapter 11 proceeding was rejected by Judge Baynes for a dif-
ferent reason in In re Yasparro.95 Yasparro involved general creditors
only, but it nevertheless is relevant to the present discussion. In
Yasparro, the individual debtor claimed that property with a "market
value" of $203,750 had a liquidation value of $7,500, because most
of the property would be exempt in a liquidation. The debtor ag-
gressively proposed a plan in which the debtor would give $32,000
over ten years at 10% interest, an amount with a present value that
exceeded $7,500. The debtor then would retain all other
property. 96
The debtor's plan clearly violated the absolute priority rule and
could not be confirmed, as the debtor retained "property," albeit
exempt, while the general creditors had not been fully paid.97 Of
interest for this discussion is a separate ground used to deny confir-
mation of the plan. "There is no dispute [that] the debtor's plan
meets the best interest of the creditor's test," wrote Judge Baynes.98
"That test, however, is not relevant to the 'fair and equitable' re-
quirement under Section 1129(b)(2)(B)." 99 Baynes then quoted
Justice Douglas as stating, "[t]o hold that in a section 77B reorgani-
zation creditors of a hopelessly insolvent debtor may be forced to
share the already insufficient assets with stockholders because apart
from rehabilitation under that section they would suffer a worse
93. Pachulski, supra note 70, at 949-50.
94. Id. at 965.
95. 100 Bankr. 91 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (Baynes, J.).
96. In re Yasparro, 100 Bankr. 91, 94 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (Baynes, J.).
97. Id. at 94-95; see also In reJohnson, 101 Bankr. 307, 309 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (Pas-
kay, J.) (holding that absolute priority rule is violated if exempt property is retained).
98. In re Yasparro, 100 Bankr. at 94.
99. Id.
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fate, would disregard the standards of fairness and equity ... ."100
According to Judge Baynes, this quotation implies that cram down
must use going concern value, or else juniors will obtain value. 10 1
But that is not what Justice Douglas meant in the above quotation.
Justice Douglas meant only that it is not equitable for shareholders
to get anything when the creditors are not fully paid.10 2 He does
not address whether creditors have a right to a going concern valua-
tion, though he did so two years later in Consolidated Rock Products Co.
v. Du Bois.10 3 Yet, as one commentator argues, Justice Douglas' as-
sociation of going concern value with the absolute priority rule is
assertory rather than logical. 10 4
It does not appear that anything can be learned about valuation of
secured claims from the absolute priority rule. Indeed, the absolute
priority rule has only an indirect relationship with secured claims. 10-5
Under the cram down provisions, secured claims must be paid in full
(albeit by uncertainly valued debt instruments). 106 If liquidation
value were to be used, an otherwise fully secured creditor might be-
come an undersecured creditor with a secured claim and an un-
secured deficit. While the secured part of the claim must be paid in
full, the unsecured deficit now qualifies for the absolute priority
rule. Under the rule, if the undersecured party dissents, the secured
party must be paid in full before the shareholders can receive any-
thing. All of this can occur even though liquidation, not going con-
cern value, is used to diminish the collateral of the secured party.
That is, if the secured party is driven underwater by liquidation
value, it is still true that the unsecured portion of the claim must be
paid in full before the junior parties can receive anything in the
100. Id. (quoting Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 124 (1939)).
101. See id (rejecting argument that cram down provision is satisfied by meeting best in-
terests test).
102. See Case, 308 U.S. at 126.
103. 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941).
104. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REv. 963, 1000 (1989). John
Ayer writes,
Justice Douglas never fully justified this view, but he seemed to acknowledge that the
Chapter X creditor loaned on the faith of the normally higher going concern value,
and that if the business is to continue after reorganization, then the creditor ought to
be able to look to value at least equal to the value in which he had an interest before
the reorganization.
Id. at 1000 (footnote omitted).
This premise ofjustifying the law based on what creditors expect can be criticized for being
circular, since the creditors expect precisely what the law allows.
105. The absolute priority rule is found in Bankruptcy Code section 1129(b)(2)(B), which
pertains only to unsecured creditors. Secured creditors are governed by a separate provision. See
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988).
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(2)(A)(i) (1988) (presenting this as one of three possible cram
down ideas).
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plan. Hence, it cannot be said that Judge Baynes has shown that the
absolute priority rule compels the use of going concern valua-
tion.10 7 Rather, the absolute priority rule works even if liquidation
value is used.
B. The Implications of Opportunity Costs as Part of Adequate Protection
If some courts imply that in reorganization cases going concern
value might be chosen, others go further to imply that going concern
value must be chosen, regardless of what would have happened in
the absence of bankruptcy. These arguments have been deduced
from the principle that a secured creditor's opportunity costs (in the
guise of postpetition interest) are not part of the adequate protec-
tion to which an undersecured party is entitled, a principle recently
endorsed by the Supreme Court.108
In the course of denying undersecured parties postpetition inter-
est as part of adequate protection, Judge King implies that going
concern valuations are the quid pro quo that justifies forced interest-
free reinvestments of collateral that, but for bankruptcy, the under-
secured party would have controlled. 10 9 So expressed, the mode of
valuation is not a function of imagining "what would have happened
if there had been no bankruptcy," but instead has a much more os-
tensible political content-compensation for a valuable right that
undersecured parties have lost.
In contrast, Judge Mabey has claimed that going concern valua-
tion is logically, not politically, connected to the inability of an un-
dersecured party to get postpetition interest. In a much-cited
opinion on whether undersecured parties should get postpetition
interest as part of adequate protection, Judge Mabey wrote "one
cannot consistently ask for going concern valuations and opportu-
107. One possible embarrassment for the conclusion in the text-that the absolute prior-
ity rule determines nothing about the standard of valuation-involves nonrecourse secured
parties, who would seem to get no unsecured deficit claim. But, as it turns out, chapter 11
changes nonrecourse lenders into recourse lenders if they elect to be so and if the collateral is
not to be sold under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1l11(b)(1) (1988) (setting forth that "[a] claim
secured by a lien ... shall be allowed or disallowed ... as if the holder of such claim had
recourse against the debtor"); see Carlson, supra note 86, at 279-82 (discussing application of
section 1111 (b) to nonrecourse secured claims). Hence, the absolute priority rule protects
even nonrecourse lenders indirectly through the unsecured deficit.
108. United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 372
(1988) (Scalia, J.).
109. See United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 808 F.2d 363,
373 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (maintaining that goal of Bankruptcy Code is to benefit creditor
of chapter I 1 debtor by preserving going concern values and thus increasing amounts recov-
erable by all creditors), aft'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
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nity costs as adequate protection." ' 1 0 In other words, postpetition
interest cannot be given as part of adequate protection because do-
ing so would rule out going concern valuation in chapter 11, a con-
clusion Judge Mabey found intolerable. The idea that opportunity
costs are part of adequate protection, he reasoned, comes from the
idea that the secured party would realize cash from the sale of the
collateral and would reinvest it, thereby earning interest."'1 This
subjunctive exercise would rule out the use of any going concern
value elsewhere in chapter 11.
Now that the Supreme Court has ruled out postpetition interest as
part of adequate protection, 112 this logic may seem to require the
use of going concern valuations in chapter 11. But this does not
necessarily follow. Counterfactual speculation being what it is, one
can easily think up a story in which there is going concern value and
postpetition interest for undersecured parties. For example, if there
had been no bankruptcy, the debtor would have sold the firm as a
going concern. These proceeds would then have been remitted to
the secured party. Thereafter, the secured party would have rein-
vested the proceeds and would have started earning interest.115
Therefore, it is plausible to argue simultaneously for an interest en-
titlement and a going concern valuation. Accordingly, the rule on
postpetition interest does not determine what valuation standard
should be used in reorganization cases.
A slightly different argument against using going concern value in
all chapter 11 cases is that approximately ninety percent of reorgani-
zations actually end up being converted into chapter 7 liquida-
tions.114 On the strength of these dismal numbers, Judge Queenan
thought that liquidation value might be used in a chapter 11 case
where the secured party sought to have the automatic stay lifted for
lack of adequate protection. 115 This reasoning, however, has its
ironic side. Because chapter 11 proceedings are rarely successful,
the secured party is deemed to have a small secured claim and a
large unsecured deficit claim. As a result of this valuation, the chap-
ter 11 proceeding is more likely to perpetuate control of the collat-
eral. That is, chapter Il's poor track record increases the chances
I 10. In re South Village, Inc., 25 Bankr. 987, 994 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (Mabey, J.) (em-
phasis in original).
111. Id. at 1002.
112. United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 372
(1988) (Scalia, J.).
113. See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 34, at 1085 (telling similar rule).
114. In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. 1, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (Queenan, J.).
115. Id.
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that chapter 11 proceedings will succeed. This is a little like the
parricide asking for mercy on the grounds of being an orphan.
C. Changing Valuation Procedures in the Middle of the Proceeding
The Bankruptcy Code pushes secured parties to favor going con-
cern value at some times, and liquidation value at other times.
Hence, the same creditor has the incentive to argue for different
valuations in the very same proceeding, while the debtor will argue
obversely from whatever the secured creditor favors.
For example, if the secured party wants a valuation of the collat-
eral to set the maximum amount of the secured claim 1 6 or if she
wants postpetition interest, the secured party prefers going concern
value. But if the secured party is demanding adequate protection or
a lifting of the automatic stay because there is no equity in the prop-
erty, she will prefer a lower liquidation value. In re Keystone Camera
Products Corp. 117 is an example of secured parties arguing for liquida-
tion value. In that case, the debtor sought postpetition financing by
means of a superpriority lien under Bankruptcy Code section
364(d)(l). 1 8 Such a lien is permissible only if the soon-to-be-
subordinated secured parties are adequately protected in their liens.
Thus, a superpriority lien is permitted when the debtor equity is so
large that, even after the superpriority lien attaches, there is plenty
left for the existing secured parties. Here is a case in which a se-
cured party will argue strongly for liquidation value, in order to
minimize the size of the superpriority lien that can be granted. If a
going concern value is awarded and the chapter 11 debtor later col-
lapses, the secured party could be driven seriously under water.' " 9
Accordingly, Judge Tuohey made the sensible decision to esti-
mate whether a reorganization plan was likely to be confirmed. If
116. That is, when the secured party is undersecured, a going concern value will help
increase the secured claim and reduce the unsecured deficit when the undersecured claim is
split in two pursuant to section 506(a).
117. 126 Bankr. 177 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1991) (Tuohey, J.).
118. In re Keystone Camera Prods. Corp., 126 Bankr. 177, 178 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1991)
(Tuohey, J.).
119. A secured party would still have the remedy of a deficitjudgment, which would carry
a superpriority under section 507(b). This priority is higher than that of the trustee and her
lawyers, but it depends on there being unencumbered assets in the estate once the deficit
judgment arises.
For another case in which a secured party argued for a low liquidation value, see Brown &
Co. Securities v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1991). In Balbus, the secured
party argued that the value of its secured claim should be reduced to reflect the hypothetical
transaction costs of disposing of the collateral. Id. at 248. If this had been accepted, the
debtor would not have qualified for chapter 13, because he would have had too much un-
secured debt. The court opted for a valuation in which transaction costs were not deducted,
so the chapter 13 proceeding could continue.
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so, he was willing to use going concern value to further postpetition
credit. But if not, he was unwilling to impose risks on existing se-
cured creditors by inflating the equity through such a valuation. Be-
cause he found reason to doubt the ability of the debtor to
reorganize, Judge Tuohey chose liquidation value.
This reversal of incentive raises the issue of whether, having cho-
sen liquidation or going concern value, a court may change stan-
dards later on. For example, could a court choose liquidation value
for adequate protection purposes, and perhaps eliminate debtor eq-
uity and the consequent right to postpetition interest under section
506(a), and then switch to going concern value in a chapter 11 plan?
Section 506(a) certainly suggests so. 120 Some courts have justified
the switch of standards on the theory that, prior to the reorganiza-
tion plan, a debtor deserves "breathing space" and hence a low
value for adequate protection, whereas in the plan itself, going con-
cern value is appropriate. 121
This practice seems arbitrary and open to manipulation. The
early use of liquidation value, so benignly called giving a debtor
"breathing space," translates into eliminating the secured party's
right to postpetition interest. But value is supposed to be an objec-
tive, unquestionable thing. A change of standards to serve pro-
debtor or pro-creditor politics belies the objectivity that valuations
are supposed to represent. 122 It would be better if a single valuation
standard was adopted for an entire bankruptcy proceeding.' 23
Keeping in mind that ninety percent of chapter 11 proceedings
fail, 124 the consequences of sticking to one valuation theory-espe-
120. Once again, the last sentence of that provision states: "Such value shall be deter-
mined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such
property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affect-
ing such creditor's interest." 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
121. In re Valley Park Group, Inc., 96 Bankr. 16, 23-24 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989) (Gerling,
J.) (determining that court is not bound by valuation method selected 17 months earlier when
case had commenced). In In re Fairfield Plaza Assocs., 115 Bankr. 358 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990)
(Killian,J.), the parties agreed liquidation value was appropriate at a section 362(d) hearing to
lift the automatic stay. The stay was then kept on because the secured party was adequately
protected and because a reorganization, within the meaning of Bankruptcy Code section
362(d), was feasible. l at 359. The debtor later tried to use liquidation value for the pur-
pose of limiting the secured party's entitlement in the chapter 11 plan. Id at 359-60. Judge
Killian chose going concern value because he thought it unfair if "[aifter having written down
the secured debt the debtor comes into confirmation with very rosy income projections." Id.
at 360.
122. See Queenan, supra note 6, at 28 (arguing that purpose of valuation is to be "neutral"
factor unrelated to wishes of debtor or creditor).
123. To be distinguished is the issue of whether, given a single standard of valuation,
numerous "second looks" at the value of collateral might be taken. I cover this difficult issue
in Carlson, supra note 86.
124. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (citing In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. 1, 5
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1990)).
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cially a going concern theory-throughout the proceeding are sig-
nificant. If a creditor is undersecured at the start of the proceeding,
a going concern valuation for such issues as adequate protection up-
holds the principle of Bankruptcy Code section 362(d)(2)(B),
wherein the debtor's retention of the collateral is premised on its
role in an effective reorganization. According to the Supreme
Court, "effective" means a reorganization in which a plan is likely to
be confirmed.' 25 Hence, a consistent going concern valuation the-
ory deters the debtor from retaining the collateral unless an effec-
tive reorganization really is possible. More adequate protection up
front is consistent with what a confirmable plan will eventually re-
quire. If this adequate protection fails, the remedy is a superpriority
under Bankruptcy Code section 507(b), a priority that outranks the
debtor's own administrative claims against the bankrupt estate. If
the debtor's own compensation is placed at risk, the debtor is more
likely to attend to the requirement that the chances for a confirmed
plan must be good. 126 Finally, a higher going concern valuation
may turn the secured creditor from an undersecured to an over-
secured creditor, justifying a postpetition interest award to the se-
cured creditor. 27 This transformation mitigates the injustice of the
debtor's power to deprive undersecured creditors of their opportu-
nity costs.' 28 These observations are consistent with Judge King's
observations in Timbers, in which she thought that going concern val-
uations are a required quid pro quo for no postpetition interest
entitlement. 29
IV. PROBLEMS INVOLVING GOING CONCERN VALUE
A. Individual Pieces of Collateral in the Going Concern
Suppose a firm has a positive going concern value. Can this value
be attributed to individual pieces of collateral held by secured par-
ties? This approach is comparatively easy when the collateral is in-
125. United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 375-
77 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
126. Two other commentators, Chaim Fortgang and Thomas Mayer, have suggested that
going concern value could be used early in a chapter 11 case. If the case collapses and liqui-
dation ensues, however, the secured creditor must be awarded a large superpriority under
section 507(b) for failed adequate protection. Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 34, at 1084-85.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1988).
128. Id.
129. United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs.), 808 F.2d 363, 373 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aft'd, 484 U.S. 365
(1988).
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ventory made to be sold. More difficult is the valuation of
equipment used in the going concern.
Once again, our subjunctive formula for calculating value is inde-
terminate. Absent bankruptcy, a secured party might repossess the
collateral and get only its liquidation value. But it is conceivable
that a secured party might also obtain a receivership or other equita-
ble help in reaching the going concern of an entire firm.' 30 There-
fore, although attribution of going concern value of the firm to
specific pieces of collateral will require the imposition of some ac-
counting fictions,' 3 ' it does not seem ruled out as a means of
valuation.
The notion of a going concern value for individual pieces of col-
lateral has been attacked by Professor Douglas Baird and Dean
Thomas Jackson.13 2 Their attack, however, is only partial. Baird
and Jackson support a rule that individual pieces of inventory might
be sold together by a single creditor to capture synergistic proper-
ties of collateral itself, provided one secured party owns all pieces of
collateral.' 33 Nothing in their article opposes the notion of valuing
inventory as if it were sold in the ordinary course of business. In-
stead, their main objection is to the allocation of a share of going
concern value of an entire firm to individual pieces of collateral used
by managers in the business. 134 In their example, a piece of equip-
ment such as a computer might be valued as if sold in the ordinary
course of the secured party's or the debtor's business, but no part of
the total going concern value of the firm could be allocated to the
computer.' 3 5 The reason for this is that the extra value is allocable
to management and not to the equipment used by management. 3 6
130. See Bowman & Thompson, supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing use of
contextual speculation in valuation hypotheticals).
131. See Queenan, supra note 6, at 54 (calling "entire process ... a nightmarish prospect"
and urging that it be ignored "for reasons of simplicity alone"). Judge Queenan's remark,
however, overlooks how breathtakingly simple accounting assumptions can be, and how
soundly accountants can sleep after making them.
132. See Baird &Jackson, Bargaining After the Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule,
55 U. Cm. L. REv. 738, 782-87 (1988) (discussing problems of courts using going concern
valuation).
133. Id. at 786-87.
134. See id. at 782-83; see also Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp. (In
re Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp.), 98 Bankr. 250, 254 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (Anderson, J.)
(finding that going concern value does not mean "value added by the collateral to a sale of the
entire business").
135. Baird &Jackson, supra note 132, at 782-83.
136. Id. at 783 n.3. Because they think management always "causes" the going concern
bonus, Baird andJackson attackJudge King's assertion that going concern value is mandated
by a political quid pro quo whereby, in exchange for no postpetition interest entitlement,
undersecured parties get higher going concern valuations. This view is described supra in the
text accompanying note 90.
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This explanation may suffice when management is not fungible,
but it fails if management is easily replaced.' 3 7 Instead, sometimes
going concern value can be attributed to the strategic position of the
hard assets themselves. 138 Furthermore, this assessment may suffer
from the "sunk cost" fallacy: management may have been brilliant
in setting up a system that works by itself, but once that brilliance is
embedded in the system, a lower-level management can keep the
system going. 13 9 Indeed, idiot-proof systemics are themselves a
hallmark of good management. If so, management is more akin to a
sunk cost or prepaid expense and cannot be deemed causally neces-
sary to future profits.140
In the end, an allocation of going concern value to specific assets
cannot be resolved by uncontroversial assertions of causation. In-
deed, one of the more clever insights of the Coase Theorem-that
fount of law and economics wisdom-is that causation is not a natu-
ral phenomenon at all, but is a legal question to be settled by eco-
nomic analysis.14 ' Therefore, Baird and Jackson are being entirely
circular when they appeal to a legal issue-causation-to settle a
legal issue-proper valuation standards.
The exact opposite causal assertion, that an income stream comes
totally from the tools and not from human talent,142 seems equally
inappropriate. In re Cook, 143 is a chapter 13 case where the secured
party claimed that a car should be valued at its replacement, not its
wholesale, value. Judge Clark wrote:
137. The explanation may fail even if management is unique. If, for example, a telephone
system or other vital equipment is repossessed from an insolvent company, going concern
value may disappear faster than if the managers quit.
138. See Queenan, supra note 6, at 57-58 (acknowledging that "in place" value is possible,
though not likely). The classic judicial account of going concern value does not even mention
management as a factor. See In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 7, 150 N.E. 581, 583 (1926) (Cardozo,
J.) (listing continuity of place and name as chief elements of "good will").
139. For a discussion of the sunk cost fallacy, see S. FISCHER & R. DORNBUSCH, INMODUC-
TION TO MICROECONOMICS 180 (1983).
140. In a more recent article, Douglas Baird has relented and admitted that, when man-
agement is fungible, management does not cause going concern value. Baird & Picker, A
Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20J. LEGAL STuD. 311, 327
(1991). This undercuts his earlier assertion that a secured creditor claiming equipment can-
not share in the going concern value of a debtor-in-possession. Baird &Jackson, supra note
132, at 782-83.
141. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J. LAw & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) (arguing that courts
should allocate costs based on economic and societal choices, rather than on analysis of cau-
sality); see Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems, a Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387,
395-96 (1981) (discussing this aspect of Coase theorem).
142. This position was taken in Sprecher v. Bank of Yates City (In re Sprecher), 65 Bankr.
598, 601 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1986) (Altenberger, J.) (determining replacement value of farm
equipment and livestock appropriate because debtor intended to continue farming) and In re
Courtwright, 57 Bankr. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1986) (Hess, J.) (using replacement value
where debtor intends to retain property).
143. 38 Bankr. 870 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (Clark, J.).
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Going concern value may mean that the debtor can use the prop-
erty to generate income greater than the price for which the prop-
erty could be sold. An example of this meaning could be tools
used by a mechanic to produce income greater than the price
which could be obtained at a sale in the used car market.... Us-
ing this meaning when valuing a consumer's car, however, is artifi-
cial. It is not use of the car that generates income for a chapter 13
debtor who uses the car to drive to and from work. It is the serv-
ices of the debtor unrelated to the use of the car that generates
income. Thus, to say that a car used to drive to and from work has
a going concern value makes little sense. 14 4
One can hardly disagree with this observation. The best that can be
said is that causation is not an uncontroversial fact in the world to
which we can appeal. Rather, it is a legal conclusion that must be
reached in pursuit of other goals and visions.
B. Use Versus Exchange Value
There is another distinction to account for within the realm of
going concern value. This is the distinction between use value and
exchange value. Use value is the amount a possessor of property
would charge to part with it, or alternatively the amount the posses-
sor would pay to prevent the property from being taken away.
Roughly speaking, use value can be equated with replacement
value. 145 Exchange value is the amount a buyer would pay for the
property. 146 Ordinarily, when exchange value exceeds use value,
the owner of property will sell. If use value exceeds exchange value,
the owner of property will retain the property and not sell.
As regards a going concern, we must not be tempted to conclude
that, if the debtor has not yet sold property, the use value exceeds
exchange value. Such a criterion assumes the debtor is rational in
retaining and not selling collateral. Or, it might assume that the
market is perfect when in fact it is highly defective. In corporate
144. In re Cook, 38 Bankr. 870, 875 n.Il (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (Clark, J.); see also Valley
Nat'l Bank v. Malody, 102 Bankr. 745, 749 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989) (Russell, J.) (finding that
retained vehicles are not essential to debtors' plan, and thus do not generate income).
145. This equation is inexact, however. Replacement value would appear to be what the
debtor would pay for an item with comparable use value. This price would include transac-
tion costs absorbed by the seller. Since no replacement is planned, the opportunity cost of
retaining the item in real life is less than the hypothetical replacement cost. Also, even if
adjusted for transaction costs, the replacement cost could still exceed the use value to the
debtor, who, in real life, would decline to replace the item in question. Both of these differ-
ences between replacement value and use value could exist while, simultaneously, the ex-
change value-what the debtor could sell the item for-would be less than both replacement
and use values.
146. See Queenan, supra note 6, at 19 (referring to amount buyer would pay as retail
value).
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cases, agency costs 14 7 might mean that use value is actually lower
than exchange value.
Finally, in cases where the debtor is the highest valuing user of
collateral, use value holds the debtor's own special expertise hos-
tage to creditor entitlements. That is, if use value is high, the
debtor's special competence is the cause. When this surplus is
awarded to a secured creditor, the debtor is being punished for her
expertise. Yet this kind of postbankruptcy expertise is the core of
the fresh start that debtors are supposed to get in bankruptcy. On
this reasoning, at least in consumer cases, exchange value seems a
better standard than use value. 148
In chapter 13, use value is often asserted in the form of "replace-
ment" value. That is, secured parties assert that the value of the
collateral ought to be enhanced from wholesale value by the idea
that the debtor would have to replace the collateral in question.' 49
Judge Queenan has indicated that the argument in favor of use over
exchange value has been almost uniformly rejected by the courts
because it is the creditors' interest in the collateral (i.e., the ex-
change value) rather than the debtors' interest in the property which
should be protected.' 50 One implication would follow when use
value is higher than exchange value. If the debtor-in-possession is
the highest valuing user who should not sell the assets, then no
transaction costs will be necessary to sell the collateral because
these costs would not exist even absent the bankruptcy. On the
other hand, if exchange value is used, then transaction costs will be
entailed because the hypothetical exchange would involve these
costs. This observation raises the issue of whether the valuation
should be affected by expected transaction costs, a subject discussed
later. 15
V. PROBLEMS INVOLVING LIQUIDATION VALUE
A. Bid-in Sales
One argument for maximizing liquidation value, by using a
147. That is, the costs imposed by self-serving managers who do not act to maximize the
position of the owners.
148. See Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp. (In re Craddock-Terry
Shoe Corp.), 98 Bankr. 250, 254-55 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1988) (Anderson, J.) (using exchange
value to set secured party's entitlement even though mailing list was more valuable to debtor
than to buyer).
149. See In re Reynolds, 17 Bankr. 489, 492-93 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (Norton, J.) (using
replacement value of automobile retained by debtor).
150. Queenan, supra note 6, at 30. For an eloquent denunciation of replacement value,
see In re Cook, 38 Bankr. 870, 872-76 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (Clark, J.).
151. See infra notes 173-207 and accompanying text.
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counterfactual "what would have happened" procedure, is for the
creditor to claim that, but for the bankruptcy, it would have bid in its
claim at a poorly attended auction and then would have sold the
collateral at a high price in the ordinary course of business. 152
Taken to an extreme, such an argument would produce a high value
beyond the amount of the secured claim which, in the hypothetical
universe, would never belong to the debtor. This value beyond the
amount the creditor could collect constitutes a profit creditors can
make by arbitraging between poorly attended liquidation sales and
later sales in the ordinary course. This hypothetical scenario, a bid-
in sale followed by an ordinary course sale, would produce a wind-
fall for secured parties in a manner that is totally consistent with
what commonly happens in nonbankruptcy practice. For example,
suppose a secured party claims $100 against collateral worth $120 if
sold in the ordinary course of business. The liquidation value, how-
ever, is only $90. The secured party might claim that she would bid
in $90 at foreclosure and receive $120 at a later commercial resale,
so that rights in the collateral actually exceed the secured claim it-
selfl Being an appeal to hypothetical history, who can disprove such
a claim?
The trouble with this argument is that the practice of creditor ar-
bitrage between ordinary course and foreclosure sales is unsavory.
Creditors cannot be bothered to maximize the price when the debtor
benefits, but when the creditor benefits suddenly the sales effort gets
sophisticated and state-of-the-art. Indeed, under the doctrine of
Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co., 15 3 the differential in an
actual sale, if sufficiently large, can be a fraudulent conveyance.1 54
It is a brave judge indeed who would hypothesize that the secured
party would have captured a high value through a practice that
amounts to a fraudulent conveyance.
On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Code itself authorizes the
practice of bidding in.155 This protection is designed to insure se-
152. See In re Asbridge, 66 Bankr. 894, 900-01 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) (Hill,J.) (referring to
bid-in process as "reasonable and established marketing techniques"). Judge Queenan
seemed to approve of the concept, but rejected it as implausible with regard to a second
mortgagee with a troubled loan portfolio, where the second mortgagee would have to pay off
the senior mortgagee in cash. See In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. 1, 6 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990)
(Queenan,J.). Judge Steen raises but does not resolve this issue in Republic Bank Houston v.
Bear Creek Ministorage, Inc. (In re Bear Creek Ministorage), 49 Bankr. 454, 457 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1985) (Steen, J.), rev'd sub nom. United Say. Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 808
F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aft'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
153. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (Rubin,J.).
154. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980).
155. 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (1988).
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cured parties against trustee misbehavior. If the trustee fails to
maximize the price, secured parties can capture the lost value by
bidding in the amount of their secured and unsecured claims. Can
we rule out a bid-in in a hypothetical universe when the Bankruptcy
Code itself sanctions the practice? Of course, in a hypothetical uni-
verse, we can do anything we want, but nevertheless a reasoned an-
swer may still be given: bid-ins may be allowed in bankruptcy as a
defense mechanism for creditors, but this fact should not counte-
nance affirmative creditor abuse, even in a hypothetical universe.
Bid-ins may be the only practical way to proceed. In NorWest Bank
Worthington v. Ahlers, 156 the court noted that third party bidders
hardly ever appear in Minnesota farm foreclosures. 157 In this cir-
cumstance, the only hope of a recovery is for the secured party to
bid in the amount of the claim and resell after the lengthy redemp-
tion period (during which time all rent and income belongs to the
farmer).
Yet if it is really true that no third party would bid for the collat-
eral, disallowing hypothetical bid-ins in a hypothetical liquidation
means that the collateral is worth near to nothing-an unjust result
for secured parties. A fair rule, then, would bar the secured party
from capturing debtor equity beyond the amount of the secured
claim. In a hypothetical universe, capturing this debtor equity is
close to obtaining a fraudulent conveyance. 158 Such a compromise
would guarantee some extra value to the secured party while not
allowing the secured party to generate value through hypothesizing
a potentially fraudulent transaction.' 59
156. 794 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1986) (Heaney, J.), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 485 U.S.
197, vacated and remanded, 844 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1988).
157. Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers (In re Ahlers), 794 F.2d 388, 397 (8th Cir.
1986) (Heaney, J.), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 485 U.S. 197, vacated and remanded, 844
F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1988).
158. Durrett is sometimes taken to specify that any price paid for collateral that is 70% or
more of the "true" market value is not a fraudulent conveyance. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage
Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 Bankr. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (Wright, J.)
(finding 62.7% of fair market yield insufficient); Berge v. Sweet (In re Berge), 33 Bankr. 642,
649-50 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (Martin,J.) (holding 68.5% insufficient); cf. Home Life Ins. v.
Jones (In re Jones), 20 Bankr. 988, 994 n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (Goldberg, J.) (rejecting
70% bright line rule in favor of case-by-case standard); see generally Note, Bankruptcy Valuation
Under Selected Liquidation Provisions, 40 VAND. L. REV. 177, 208-09 (1987) (discussing Durrett
rule's impact on foreclosure proceedings). This leeway suggests that a secured party may
hypothesize a bid-in and later ordinary course sale that yields a nonfraudulent 142.8% (100/
70) of the bid-in amount.
159. Cf Queenan, supra note 6, at 59-62. Judge Queenan approves the idea of hypothesiz-
ing bid-ins, but apparently has in mind an undersecured party using bid-ins to advance to a
fully secured state. Id. at 59-60. He does not explicitly address the possibility of a bid-in as a
means of capturing more than the amount of the undersecured party's total claim. This abil-
ity to overcollect the debt is the abuse that the text means to denounce.
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B. The Debtor's Fear of Losing Going Concern Value in a Foreclosure
Sale
Another reason a security interest might exceed the value of the
collateral itself is that, in a no-bankruptcy world, a debtor might ac-
tually pay an undersecured creditor rather than suffer a foreclosure
sale. In so doing, the debtor is motivated by the thought that the
collateral as a going concern has a greater value than the liquidation
value implied by the foreclosure sale. If so, the value of the security
interest might exceed the value of the collateral. This scenario is
one of many, then, that conflates liquidation value and going con-
cern value.
Judge Queenan, a great champion of conducting valuations in a
strict no-bankruptcy world, raises and dismisses this possibility. He
states:
Normally, outside of Chapter 11 . . . [a] mortgagor typically
wishes to honor his obligation in order to avoid foreclosure, with-
out regard to whether or not some of the mortgage debt may in
fact be unsecured. But that consideration is not present in any
degree here because of the Debtor's ability to obtain confirmation
of a "cram down" plan proposing a payment schedule having a
present value equal only to [a secured party's] "interest in the es-
tate's interest in such property." Thus the value of the ... mort-
gage can never rise above the value of its property interest aspects
at the time of confirmation. 16 0
In other words, Queenan dismisses the hypothetical possibility that
a security interest might exceed the value of the collateral because a
bankruptcy rule prevents that result. This violates the premise that
we are supposed to imagine what would have happened if there
were no bankruptcy petition.
Meanwhile, Judge Queenan's speculation that the security interest
might be worth more than the collateral is not precluded by the sub-
junctive rules governing valuation. Certainly one of the bargaining
chips a secured party has over a debtor is that the debtor will lose
value if the foreclosure sale is allowed to go forward. Nothing
would preclude Judge Queenan's suggested valuation technique
from a strict no-bankruptcy perspective. It does, however, stray
from the notion that, absent a bankruptcy, the secured party would
foreclose. Rather, it presupposes the debtor would keep the se-
cured claim current in order to prevent the loss of going concern
value. As such, the speculation suggested by Judge Queenan is a
160. In re Robbins, 119 Bankr. 1, 5 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (quoting 11 U.S.C.
§ 1229(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1988)).
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mode of capturing going concern value of the collateral in the ab-
sence of a chapter 11 petition.
C. Buyback Arrangements
Sometimes a secured party who buys chattel paper16 1 has a con-
tractual right to force the seller to take back the chattel paper and
pay the account debtor's unpaid balance. This arrangement-simi-
lar to a "put"-6 2 -can provide a secured party with a greater sum of
money than the amount another buyer would pay for the collateral.
With regard to bankruptcy valuations, the issue arises as to whether
the secured party should have a claim equal to the chargeback right
or the lesser amount an abstract buyer would pay for collateral.'6 3
Suppose, for example, that a car dealer sold a car to a consumer
for a price that includes $5000 in credit, for which the dealer took a
purchase money security interest in the car. Suppose further that
the dealer sells the chattel paper to a bank on the promise to pay the
bank whatever balance the consumer cannot pay in the event of de-
fault. If the consumer goes bankrupt, the collateral must be valued.
Assuming that the bank could get back $4000 from the dealer but
could sell the car for only $3000 on a wholesale basis, what value
should be assigned to the collateral?
Here the indeterminacy of the "what if" test is very severe. If the
question is "what would the secured party have received if there had
been no bankruptcy?," the secured party would be entitled to the
higher chargeback value because the dealer was obligated to pay this
much. But if the question is "what could the secured party have
sold the car for?," the secured party would only be entitled to the
lower wholesale value. Complicating the matter is the fact that the
dealer in this situation might be able to get a retail price for the car,
while the bank could only get a wholesale price.
From the bankruptcy trustee's standpoint, the secured party's
right to receive the unpaid balance from the dealer has no necessary
relation to the original collateral-in this instance, the car. If this
chargeback value is used, the trustee is faced with a value that is
161. See U.C.C. § 9-105(b) (1990) (defining chattel paper as "a writing or writings which
evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or lease of specific goods ... ").
162. See Goldberg Sec., Inc. v. Scarlata (In re Scarlata) (Leinenweber, J.), No. 90 C 2933
(N.D. Ill. May 30, 1991) (1991 WL 107902) (defining put option as option to sell stock at
specified price by certain time in future).
163. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (MB) 506.04[2], at 506-35 (15th ed. 1991) (discussing
how presence of repurchase agreement between dealer and secured party can affect valuation
process).
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potentially too high. 164 Indeed, the chargeback right can effectively
transform the sale of chattel paper into a loan from the bank to the
dealer, which is not a sale at all. The result is that the dealer's per-
sonal obligation to pay the bank if the account debtor defaults is not
connected with a price of the collateral.
Only one reported case uses the chargeback value based on what
the dealer would be obligated to pay the secured party under a re-
purchase agreement. 165 Other courts have roundly rejected this ap-
proach and have favored the debtor in this regard. 166 The pro-
debtor position is especially appropriate if the secured party's rela-
tion to the dealer is the usual one of principal and surety. Even if
the automatic stay prevents the secured party from repossessing the
car, the secured party should still have its chargeback right against
the dealer, who, as subrogee, then stands in the shoes of the secured
party and takes over the security interest. This arrangement has
nothing to do with the value of the collateral. In essence, the surety
is buying the secured claim, not the collateral.
On the other hand, suretyship might have an indirect effect on val-
uation. Suppose the secured party can obtain only wholesale value
while the dealer can obtain retail value. If so, it would seem fair to
use retail value because the dealer, as a subrogated secured party,
could actually realize this amount if there were no bankruptcy.
If the chargeback right is not a suretyship, so that a buyer has no
subrogation rights against the debtor, then it might be a genuine
sale of the collateral, not a sale of the secured claim. On this prem-
164. See id. (stating that repurchase agreement's price often exceeds price that could be
obtained in arm's length transaction, whether wholesale, resale, or private).
165. In re Stumbo, 7 Bankr. 939 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (Keller, J.). Stumbo and some of
the early cases involved an odd standard form produced by Chrysler Credit Corporation. In
Stumbo, Judge Keller described this particular contract as follows:
[T]he dealer in turn assigned the paper to Chrysler Credit Corp. pursuant to a provi-
sion which requires that if repossession occurs within 90 days after the maturity of the
earliest installment of the contract then unpaid, the dealer will repurchase the con-
tract at a specific dollar amount regardless of its condition. The 90-day period is
stayed by the filing of litigation.
Id. at 940 (emphasis added); see also In re Beranek, 9 Bankr. 864, 866 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981)
(Clark, J.) (finding that Chrysler could pursue dealer only if estate surrendered the car). Two
commentators assume that the secured party could charge back its loss to the dealer only if a
repossession were achieved. Bowman & Thompson, supra note 47, at 576-77. In case the
account debtor is bankrupt, no chargeback right would be possible. They suggest that these
contracts should have been written as straight suretyships. Id.
166. See generally Grubbs v. National Bank, 114 Bankr. 450 (D.S.C. 1990) (Henderson, J.);
In re Cook, 38 Bankr. 870 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (Clark, J.); In re Klein, 20 Bankr. 493 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1982) (Hertz, J.); In re Beranek, 9 Bankr. 864 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (Clark, J.);
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Van Nort (In re Van Nort), 9 Bankr. 218 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981)
(Patton, J.); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Cooper (In re Cooper), 7 Bankr. 537 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1980) (Norton, J.).
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ise, In re Oklahoma City Broadcasting Co. 167 was wrongly decided.
In Oklahoma City Broadcasting, the secured party had a $3 million
"put" option that would yield more than the liquidation value of the
debtor.168 Characterizing the difference between the higher put op-
tion value and the liquidation value as an anticompetitive "bounty"
paid to shut down a competitor, Judge TeSelle refused to adopt the
value of the buyer's offer.' 69 Judge TeSelle's justification for this
refusal was fanciful, to the point of being incomprehensible.
Judge TeSelle cited a case in which it was held that an agreement
by a landlord to buy out a tenant's leasehold was not a general in-
tangible within the meaning of article 9.170 "Therefore," reasoned
Judge TeSelle:
the creditor with a security interest in debtors' general intangibles
was not entitled to payments made to debtors in exchange for
debtors' termination of the lease. Likewise, in this case, where the
Bounty is being offered to take Debtor off the air, it is not a gen-
eral intangible within the purview of [the secured party's] security
interest, and thus not a part of [the secured party's] Collateral. 17 1
The thrust of this argument is that the secured party does not own
the right to collect the so-called bounty that a buyer was willing to
pay for the collateral. Judge TeSelle has forgotten, however, that
the sales price agreed upon was a contract in anticipation of a fore-
closure sale. The $3 million in question was not collateral, but a
buyer's paymentfor collateral. As such, the "bounty" would be cash
proceeds from the disposal of collateral within the meaning of sec-
tion 9-504(1) of the U.C.C. and would clearly belong to the secured
party.
Here is a case in which the put price should have been used for
valuation purposes. Although Judge TeSelle was properly con-
cerned with the anticompetitive quality of the put option, neverthe-
less if the sale was legal under our (recently degraded) antitrust laws
and if the buyer actually would have paid this price, it would appear
that the put option would be sound evidence of what the secured
167. 112 Bankr. 425 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990) (TeSelle, J.).
168. In re Oklahoma City Broadcasting Co., 112 Bankr. 425, 427 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1990) (TeSelle, J.).
169. Id. at 429-30.
170. Devine v. Swartz (In re Swartz), 62 Bankr. 88, 90 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986) (Mahoney,
J.). In this case, a secured creditor held a leasehold as collateral. The tenant filed for bank-
ruptcy. In order to prevent the assumption of this lease, the landlord offered to pay the ten-
ant's trustee $100,000. This obligation to pay $100,000 was held not to be a general
intangible under article 9. Rather, it was connected to the lease and had to be perfected
under real estate law. Since only article 9 perfection existed, the trustee took the $100,000
free and clear of the secured creditor's security interest. Id. at 89-90.
171. In re Oklahoma City Broadcasting Co., 112 Bankr. at 430.
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party would obtain if it sold the collateral. 172
VI. THE RELATION BETWEEN TRANSACTION COSTS AND VALUE
In general, the value of property to a buyer and to a seller is dif-
ferent by virtue of the costs of the transaction. What the buyer pays
is not necessarily the same as what the seller realizes from the sale.
It is important for judges to be aware of the relation between market
value and expected transaction costs because it is all too easy to
modulate between choosing a price that the buyer will pay (before
transaction costs are covered by the seller), or the price the seller
will receive (after transaction costs are covered). Thus, we are faced
not only with a terminological confusion, but a substantive property
entitlement confusion when presented with the notion of the
"value" of collateral.
Defining the value of collateral as what a buyer would pay minus
the transaction costs of the sale' 78 comports with the subjunctive
exercise of figuring out how much a secured party would get if there
had been no bankruptcy and the secured party had to foreclose it-
self. Outside of bankruptcy, a secured party would bear the transac-
tion costs if undersecured, but, if oversecured, she can make the
debtor bear these costs. 174 The deduction of transaction costs in
the valuation determination is also supported by section 506(c) of
the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that if sales or maintenance
expenses are actually incurred, the trustee may recover those costs
from the collateral.' 75 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has sup-
ported this definition of value.' 76
172. Judge TeSelle's reliance on In re Swartz is inapposite for another reason. In Swartz,
the landlord's obligation to pay was owed to the debtor. Devine v. Swartz (In re Swartz), 62
Bankr. 88, 89 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986) (Mahoney, J.). In Oklahoma City Broadcasting, however, the
buyer owed its obligation to the secured party, not to the debtor. Hence, it was appropriate
to use the put price as evidence of what a buyer would pay for the collateral.
Instead of using this price or a going concern value, Judge TeSelle eventually chose an
appraised liquidation value for the collateral in question. In re Oklahoma City Broadcasting
Co., 112 Bankr. 425, 430 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1990).
173. See generally New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 437 (1970) (Stewart, J.);
United States v. Coby (In re Coby), 126 Bankr. 593, 596 (D. Nev. 1991) (Pro,J.); Royal Bank v.
Figueroa Ruiz (In re Figueroa Ruiz), 121 Bankr. 419,422 (D.P.R. 1990) (Perez-Gimenez,J.); In
re Robbins, 119 Bankr. 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (Queenan,J.); In re Boring, 91 Bankr. 791,
795 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (Cole, J.); In re Claeys, 81 Bankr. 985, 992 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987)
(Hill, J.); Greives v. Bank of W. Ind. (In re Greives), 81 Bankr. 912, 963 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1987) (Lindquist, CJ.).
174. See U.C.C. §§ 9-504(1)(a), (b) (1972) (setting forth that proceeds of collateral applied
first to transaction costs and only thereafter to secured claim).
175. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988) (setting forth that trustee may recover costs and ex-
penses of preserving or disposing of property to extent of any benefit to holder of secured
claim); see also In re Trim-X, Inc., 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1982) (Swygert, J.) (stating that
trustee's expenses for preserving assets will be recoverable from secured creditor).
176. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 239 (1989) (Blackmun, J.)
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Defining value as what the secured party takes out, not what the
buyer pays in, contradicts the Bankruptcy Code in one respect.
Under this view, collateral will always have an equity cushion at the
time of valuation, 177 although it may disappear through deprecia-
tion. According to section 362(d)(2)(A), a secured party is entitled
to have bankruptcy's automatic stay lifted if the debtor has no equity
in the collateral.1 78 If the definition of value always includes debtor
equity, then section 362(d)(2)(A) is wrongfully deprived of its
necessity.
It is a rule of statutory construction that no statutory language
should be rendered useless by a particular interpretation of other
statutory language.' 7 9 Thus, in United Savings Association of Texas v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, 80Justice Scalia denied that postpe-
tition interest was part of adequate protection because, if so, section
362(d)(2) would be rendered superfluous.' 8 ' While Scalia's argu-
ment is a failure,' 82 Timbers nevertheless stands for the potential effi-
cacy of such arguments in general. Thus, a definition of value that
always guarantees a debtor equity should be ruled out by such an
argument. 83
On the basis of this dilemma, Judge Smallenberger, who implicitly
(stating that "if a $50,000 claim were secured by a lien on property having a value of $75,000,
the claim would be oversecured, provided the trustee's costs of preserving or disposing of the
property were less than $25,000.").
177. See Overholt v. Farm Credit Servs. (In re Overholt), 125 Bankr. 202, 215 (S.D. Ohio
1990) (Kinneary,J.) (stating that "the creditor's interest in, the property is in a sense, always
less than the fair market value of the disputed property").
178. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A) (1988). In addition, the property must not be necessary for
an effective reorganization. d § 362(d)(2)(B).
179. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 415 (1970) (Harlan, J.) (noting that courts
should construe all statutes to give them some meaning); Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118,
124 (1902) (McKenna, J.) (stating that presumption exists against construction that would
render statute ineffective); In re Tom Carter Enters., 49 Bankr. 243, 245 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1985) (Pagter, J.) (stating that it cannot be assumed that Congress passed meaningless
legislation).
180. 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
181. See United States Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 374-
75 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (stating that proposed interpretation of section 362(d)(1) would render
section 362(d)(2) null).
182. Such arguments can be defeated merely by thinking up some use for the statute that
is alleged to be superfluous. Therefore, if secured parties are paid opportunity costs as part
of adequate protection, a secured party still has the incentive to use section 362(d)(2) when-
ever the secured party believes the court's valuation is too low or if the interest compensation
is inadequate. Carlson, supra note 17, at 608-09.
183. See In re Felten, 95 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1988) (Melloy, J.). In Felten, the
debtor argued that the secured party's collateral should be valued according to what a secured
party would get (after transaction costs) at a foreclosure sale. Id. at 629-30. The court re-
jected this standard and instead chose the "fair market value," which is "the price which a
willing seller under no compulsion to sell and a willing buyer under no compulsion to buy
would agree upon ...... Id at 630 (citing In re Robinson Ranch, Inc., 75 Bankr. 606, 608
(Bankr. D. Mont. 1987)). By this, the court seemed to mean a standard based on what a buyer
pays in, not on what a seller clears after transaction costs.
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adopted the view that value is always ex hypothetical transaction
costs, was forced to rule that a secured party was entitled to have the
automatic stay lifted even if the collateral was worth more than the
secured claim.184 Judge Smallenberger noted that "the law has
never meant that there must be absolutely no equity in property,
because the secured creditor needs some cushion in order to pay
the costs of foreclosure in state court."' 8 5 Hence, Judge Smal-
lenberger was able to save a definition of value that deducts hypo-
thetical transaction costs, but only at the expense of re-writing
section 362(d)(2)(A) to mean that the stay can be lifted even if
debtor equity exists.
A great many cases try to wring section 506(a) for answers to the
question whether hypothetical transaction costs should be de-
ducted. It is commonly said that the first and second sentences of
section 506(a) are in contradiction.18 6 The decision as to whether to
deduct hypothetical transaction costs is therefore seen as a matter of
privileging one of these sentences over the other.'8 7
One line of cases chooses the first sentence. According to Judge
Hill, "[tihe first sentence ... suggests that since it is the creditor's
interest that is being valued and not the collateral itself, it should
not make any difference whether the debtor is retaining the
property."' 188
This comment is identical to an argument Judge Queenan made
in a different context. Queenan attempted to establish that, in a re-
organization case, a secured creditor could be awarded only liquida-
tion value in spite of the second sentence of section 506(a).' 89 He
also emphasized that the first sentence referred to the "creditor's
interest," which supposedly excused him from applying the second
sentence. Here too Judge Hill seems to be suggesting that, since
184. In re Skains, 46 Bankr. 500, 502 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1984) (Smallenberger, J.).
185. Id. at 502.
186. The first sentence reads: "An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on prop-
erty... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's
interest in such property .... 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
The second sentence reads: "Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the
valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with
any hearing of such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest." Id.
187. Wolk v. Goldome Realty Credit Corp. (In re 222 Liberty Assocs.), 105 Bankr. 798,
803 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (Scholl, J.) (noting "tension between the first sentence and the
second sentence"); In re Claeys, 81 Bankr. 985, 990 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (Hill, J.) (stating
"[w]hether a valuation is made without regard for potential costs of liquidation depends, it
seems, upon the emphasis given to the first and second sentences .... ).
188. In re Claeys, 81 Bankr. at 990; see also In re Ward, 13 Bankr. 710, 712 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1981) (Sidman,J.) (stating that "[t]he distinction to be drawn is between the value of the
property and the value of the creditor's interest in such property").
189. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
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the creditor has a lien, transaction costs must always be deducted,
even when the debtor does not intend to sell the collateral. Hence,
Judge Hill's argument effectively establishes liquidation value in re-
organization cases, as well as the more modest principle that hypo-
thetical transaction costs should be deducted from the value
assigned to a secured claim.' 90
A second line of authority privileges the second sentence of sec-
tion 506(a), holding that, where the debtor does not intend to sell
collateral, hypothetical transaction costs should not be deducted.' 9 '
Judge Scholl uses the following argument to establish the
supremacy of the second sentence over the first:
The first sentence requires that the court value the creditor's in-
terest in the estate interest in the secured property. Thus, the credi-
tor's interest can be ascertained only after the estate's interest is
ascertained. As the second sentence dictates, the estate's interest
must be measured in light of the disposition and use of the prop-
erty articulated in the debtor's plan. Therefore, if the debtor
plans to retain the property valued under § 506(a), we do not be-
lieve that it is proper to factor in hypothetical sale CoStS. 19 2
In other words, the first sentence defers to the second. Under the
second sentence, the collateral is valued on the assumption that the
debtor is retaining the collateral. This valuation theory eliminates ex
190. See In re Courtright, 57 Bankr. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986) (Hess, J.) (recognizing
that this argument commits judge to liquidation value generally in reorganization cases).
191. See In re Brown & Co. Sec. Corp. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246, 251-52 (4th
Cir. 1991) (Ervin,J.) (arguing that since debtor would retain house, section 506(a) requires no
deduction of transaction costs); In re Landing Assocs., 122 Bankr. 288, 294 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1990) (Clark, J.) (reasoning that when debtor intends to keep property and creditor is not
getting it, it would be artificial to deduct costs that creditor will not incur, so that creditor's
interest should be determined without consideration of hypothetical liquidation costs); Cobb
v. Mortgage Default Servs. (In re Cobb), 122 Bankr. 22, 26 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (Scholl, J.)
(rejecting debtor's suggestion that foreclosure costs should be deducted from property's mar-
ket value because debtor intended to retain property rather than sell it); Usry v. United States
Small Business Admin. (In re Usry), 106 Bankr. 759, 761 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989) (Laney, J.)
(relying on section 506(a)'s direction that value should be determined in light of collateral's
intended use in agreeing with cases holding that if debtor maintains possession of collateral,
hypothetical liquidation costs should not be deducted from collateral's value); Wolk v.
Goldome Realty Credit Corp. (In re 222 Liberty Assocs.), 105 Bankr. 798, 803-04 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1989) (Scholl, J.) (stating that issue of whether sale costs should be deducted depends on
debtor's intended future use of property, and finding that because debtor intended to retain
home, valuation should not deduct hypothetical sales costs); In re Balbus, 104 Bankr. 767, 769
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (Tice, J.) (finding no hypothetical foreclosure costs when debtor in-
tends to retain collateral); In re Bellman Farms, Inc., 86 Bankr. 1016, 1019 (Bankr. D.S.D.
1988) (Ecker, J.) (citing second sentence of section 506(a) for proposing that hypothetical
liquidation costs should not be deducted from collateral's value); In re Courtwright, 57 Bankr.
495, 497 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986) (Hess, J.) (concluding that there is no reduction for costs of
foreclosure when debtor intends to retain and use property).
192. Wolk v. Goldome Realty Credit Corp. (In re 222 Liberty Assocs.), 105 Bankr. 798,
803 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (Scholl, J.).
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hypothetical transaction costs. 193 Hence, by the time the first sen-
tence can have its effect, the question of transaction costs has al-
ready been decided.
Another court found inspiration from United States Savings Associa-
tion v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,194 where Justice Scalia said,
"[t]he phrase 'value of such creditor's interest' in § 506(a) means
'the value of the collateral.' "195 Hence, the first sentence of section
506(a) merely replicates the second sentence; the sentences are not
in contradiction, and it is appropriate to consider the fact that, in a
reorganization case, the collateral will be retained by the debtor,
rather than sold. 196
The view that refuses to deduct hypothetical transaction costs
when the debtor will retain the collateral violates the subjunctive
rule that the secured claim should equal what the secured creditor
would have received had there been no bankruptcy, at least in those
circumstances where, upon default, the secured party would actually
foreclose and incur transaction costs. Additionally, this view is not
mandated by a going concern valuation because going concerns can
be sold, in which case transaction costs would be incurred. 197 Noth-
ing inherent in the idea of going concern value, therefore, dictates a
rule that transaction costs ought to be left out of valuations.
A compromise between the above two positions-hypothesize a
sale versus ignore the sale in reorganization cases-can be found in a
view that hypothesizes a sale whenever the collateral is incidental to
the reorganization. In In re Coby,198 Judge Riegle finds this standard
by misreading another case' 99 in which the court simply pointed out
that the replacement value of a car should not be assigned in a chap-
ter 13 case when the car was "incidental" to the debtor's earning
ability.200 Nevertheless, Judge Riegle's standard is a good one in
193. Id at 803-04.
194. 484 U.S. 365, 372 (1988) (ScaliaJ.).
195. United States Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 356, 372
(1988) (ScaliaJ.). This remark occurs in Scalia's disposition as to what the identical words in
section 361 mean. By emphasizing that section 506(a) requires the valuation of the collateral,
he argued that the value of the secured claim is excluded from the meaning of the phrase.
Hence, he ruled, undersecured creditors do not deserve interest compensation for their se-
cured claims, when the claim is not paid during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
at 372-73.
196. Brown & Co. Sec. Corp. v. Balbus (In re Balbus), 933 F.2d 246, 248-49 (4th Cir.
1991) (Ervin, J.).
197. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (explaining concept of going concern
valuation).
198. 109 Bankr. 963, 965 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1990) (RiegleJ.).
199. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Malody (In re Malody), 102 Bankr. 745 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1989)
(Russell, J.).
200. Id. at 749.
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chapter 11 cases, where the secured party could obtain relief from
the automatic stay in any case where the collateral is "not necessary
to an effective reorganization." 20 1 Where this is the case, a hypothe-
sized sale seems appropriate because the stay in theory could be
lifted. However, this rationale would not work in a chapter 13 case
where the debtor keeps possession of all property of the estate
throughout the proceeding. 20 2
In going concern cases involving a retail business, even assuming
that transaction costs should not be deducted because there will be
no sale, it is still appropriate to deduct the debtor's costs of doing
business, at least where inventory is the collateral. 203 This invites a
bankruptcy court to lower the value of collateral by hypothetically
allocating to it all the debtor's administrative expenses,20 4 some-
thing that section 506(c) allegedly does not permit to be allo-
cated. 205 And yet, at least in inventory cases, if we refuse to allocate
the debtor's overhead expenses to individual pieces of inventory, we
commit ourselves to the idea that the going concern exists sepa-
rately from the inventory, when, in fact, the inventory is the busi-
ness. For that reason, excluding debtor overhead and the like from
hypothetical transaction costs in determining the value of collateral
ends up being arbitrary.
If the value of collateral is to be reduced by the seller's expected
transaction costs, the issue remains as to whether the bankruptcy
court should deduct the sales expense that would have occurred
under state law if the secured party had repossessed without inter-
ference from bankruptcy, or whether the court should deduct the
sales expense that a trustee would incur in bankruptcy.
The former solution-imagine the expenses that would have oc-
curred if no bankruptcye-is more consistent with the subjunctive
201. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1988).
202. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (1988). But see Brown & Co. Sec. Corp. v. Balbus (In re Balbus),
933 F.2d 246, 253 (4th Cir. 1991) (Murnaghan,J., dissenting) (urging that hypothetical trans-
action costs should be applied even in chapter 13 when collateral is irrelevant to producing
income).
203. See Queenan, supra note 6, at 33 (favoring reducing value of inventory by allocated
cost of some overhead items); Pachulski, supra note 70, at 962 (arguing same).
204. See McQuinn v. Dial Fin. Co. (In re McQuinn), 6 Bankr. 899, 900 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1980) (Crawford, J.) (reducing car's value from $2,800 to $1,800 because of costs such as
dealer overhead, salesman's commission, and profit which debtor should not be required to
pay). The deduction of profit seems dubious here. The standard should be what a buyer
would pay minus transaction costs. This amount would include a profit for the dealer.
205. For the standards under which actual transaction costs can be charged to a secured
party, see Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Expenses of Bankruptcy Administration, (to be published
in North Carolina Law Review). Here, of course, we are talking about h)pothetical transaction
costs, and whether they are part of the valuation standard.
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"what if" standard. This standard, however, is subject to the usual
indeterminacy.
Article 9 of the UCC provides for very cheap self-help remedies
for the secured party. If it is assumed that a secured party would
have access to a peaceful repossession and private sale, then the ex-
pected transaction costs to be deducted from the value of the collat-
eral will be quite low, and the secured party's claim will be
concomitantly high. But it does not follow that self-help will be
available. If the debtor threatens a breach of the peace, a secured
party is required to abandon self-help remedies and use judicial pro-
cess, which may be expensive. If these are the facts imagined, then
the transaction costs will be high, and the creditor's secured claim in
bankruptcy will be lower. Thus, if the court perceives the debtor to
be a good citizen who does not threaten violence, then, under the
subjunctive premise of imagining what would have happened, the
secured party benefits. But if the debtor is nasty and boorish, then
the debtor (or at least the debtor's general creditors) will be enriched.
The result is a definition of value that punishes people for our good
opinion of them and rewards people for our contempt. But such a
result is mandated if we are to emulate what would have happened
in a subjunctive market.
Using state law transaction costs to define value is consistent with
imagining what would have happened had no bankruptcy occurred,
but this approach denies the reality of the bankruptcy proceeding
itself where the trustee's sales expense is sure to be higher than arti-
cle 9's cheap self-help remedies. 206 Thus, if a buyer would pay $100
for the collateral, and if the most efficient trustee imaginable would
still incur $10 in sales expense, it is tempting to conclude that the
secured party's maximum secured claim in bankruptcy ought to be
$90, even if the secured party would have realized $95 under state
law. Yet to succumb to this temptation is to violate the premise of
"what would have happened if there had been no bankruptcy."
Regardless of whether value is reduced by expected state law ex-
206. According to the Congressional Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States:
The procedures required by the Act in the sale of property of a bankrupt estate have
been much criticized for the inordinate administrative detail and expense. The
trustee must ordinarily obtain court approval in the form of an order permitting the
sale; creditors must ordinarily be notified of any proposed sale; the property must
ordinarily be appraised; the sale must ordinarily be a public sale, and the trustee's
sale is subject to approval or disapproval by the court. Not only are such procedures
not conducive to getting the best price, but the expenses frequently consume a sub-
stantial part of the proceeds obtained from the sale.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No.
93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 15-17 (1973).
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penses or federal expenses, this practice of valuing collateral ex
transaction costs poses a conceptual difficulty if the trustee aban-
dons the collateral without ever having spent anything. Suppose, in
the example just used, that the trustee chooses to abandon the col-
lateral because the debtor has no equity and the property is not
needed in a reorganization. Suppose further that the secured
party's total claim is $100, so that, under the rule of section 506(a),
the secured party has a perfectly secured claim of $90 (pursuant to
the definition of value under consideration) and a perfectly un-
secured claim of $10. If the trustee abandons property, the secured
party can realize $95. To avoid overcompensating the secured
party, a court must be prepared to adjust downward the secured
party's unsecured claim from $10 to $5, a process that is sure to
complicate the administration of bankrupt estates. Such a practice
requires a liberal approach toward "second look" doctrines that al-
low the bankruptcy court to shift the value of collateral up or down
depending on the circumstances.20 7
VII. CONCLUSION
While the bankruptcy process absolutely depends on the concept
of collateral having a value, the legal and even philosophical status
of that concept is far from clear. It is not clear when a court should
use a high going concern value or a low liquidation value. It is not
even clear what these terms mean in their own right. It is equally
unclear whether a bankruptcy court should be allowed to change
valuation standards in the middle of the proceeding, depending on
the pro- or anti-debtor sentiments of the court. Neither is it dear
whether valuations based on creditor bid-ins are allowed when liqui-
dation value is used or whether valuations should be reduced for
probable transaction costs.
The answer to these questions profoundly affects substantive
bankruptcy rights. Yet, important as the answers are, they will per-
207. This is a difficult subject which I have addressed elsewhere. Carlson, supra note 86.
The point in the text concerns adjusting valuations in light of abandonment so that the se-
cured party does not have to pay transactions costs twice--once hypothetically in the valua-
tion and once actually after the collateral is abandoned. This proposition is supported by In re
Trim-X, 695 F.2d 296, 301 (7th Cir. 1982) (Swygert, J.), where the trustee incurred actual
expenses in dealing with the collateral and thereafter abandoned the property. After aban-
donment, the trustee sought to charge the secured party for all relevant expenses under sec-
tion 506(c). The court ruled that the expenses before abandonment (in anticipation of using
the property in a reorganization) could not be charged to the secured party, since it provided
no "benefit" to it. But expenses involved in the act of abandoning itself could be charged to
the secured party. Thus, the court insisted on relieving the secured party of actual expenses
before abandonment. Id. One may therefore infer that the court would also support relief
from hypothetical expenses that brought down the valuation.
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haps inevitably be arrived at in an unsystematic manner because of
the subjunctive quality of valuations. Subjunctivity is neither sub-
jective nor objective, but is rather a third kind of knowledge consti-
tuted by mysterious combinations of subject and object.
The difficulty in dealing with these conditions, however, does not
mean valuation in bankruptcy is unreliable or worthless. The sub-
junctive speculation on which valuations are based is the foundation
of judgment itself. We are constantly equating one thing with an-
other, even though to do so is an act of violence to the things being
equated. This is what Hegel called our condition of finitude. 208 To
condemn valuation as proof of bankruptcy's deficiency is to dismiss
communication itself as an impossibility. 209 Fundamental to any
thought system, subjunctive speculation cannot be banished from
the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, it behooves us to understand
the nature of this mode of reasoning.
208. HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC 130 (A. Miller trans. 1969).
209. See Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temp-
tations of the New Legal Formalism, 11 CARDOZO L. REv. 1211, 1221-27 (1990) (asserting that
interpretation and communication themselves involve valuation and analogizing these seman-
tic valuations to economic valuations of market exchanges).
